Liberty’s second reading briefing on the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill in the House of Commons

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About Liberty

Liberty (The National Council for Civil Liberties) is one of the UK’s leading civil liberties and human rights organisations. Liberty works to promote human rights and protect civil liberties through a combination of test case litigation, lobbying, campaigning and research.

Liberty Policy

Liberty provides policy responses to Government consultations on all issues which have implications for human rights and civil liberties. We also submit evidence to Select Committees, Inquiries and other policy fora, and undertake independent, funded research.

Liberty’s policy papers are available at http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/policy/

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Introduction

1. This is the seventh counter-terrorism Bill introduced in fourteen years, brought forward against the backdrop of the spread of ISIL in the power vacuum that has developed in Iraq and Syria. Parliament has been asked to approve the Bill – which contains sweeping and unprecedented new powers for the authorities - on a fast-tracked timetable.

- Part 1 contains new powers for summary passport seizure at ports and borders and an Executive power to invalidate passports and prevent the return of British citizens outside of the jurisdiction;
- Part 2 contains reforms to the TPIMs regime and reintroduces an Executive power to internally exile individuals within the UK for up to two years;
- Part 3 extends the Home Secretary’s indiscriminate power to require communications companies to retain communications data;
- Part 4 creates a new authority to carry scheme which will, for the first time, forbid airline carriers from taking British citizens and entire categories of nationality in and out of the country;
- Part 5 places a statutory duty on public authorities – including schools, universities, NHS trusts, nurseries and local councils - to prevent terrorism as part of their functions;
- A further significant reform has been included in Part 6 the Bill which amends the *Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000* (RIPA) to allow for the warrantless interception of all post sent within the UK or to and from the UK.

2. Liberty believes that it is the vital task of Government, security and law enforcement agencies to protect life through targeted and effective surveillance, criminal investigations and prosecution. Sadly this Bill ignores reforms that could improve the effectiveness of investigations and continues the discredited trend of unnecessary and unjust blank cheque powers that have the potential to undermine long term security. Last week, the Intelligence and Security Committee published a report into the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby which contained a devastating and detailed critique of the Agencies’ strategy. Liberty urges parliamentarians to critique the proposals in this Bill in light of these catalogue failings, some of which would be further encouraged by the proposals in this Bill.
Powers to seize travel documents

3. Clause 1, Schedule 1 makes provision for the seizure and temporary retention of passports and travel tickets. Under paragraph 2, a police officer at a port in Great Britain or Northern Ireland would have the power to require a person to hand over travel documents; to search a person for travel documents; to inspect any travel document handed over or found; and, to retain travel documents. This power would be exercisable if the officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that the person is there with the intention of leaving GB/UK for the purpose of involvement in terrorism-related activity outside the UK, or if the person has arrived in GB/NI with the intention of leaving the UK soon for that same purpose. A police officer would also be able to direct a customs or immigration officer to exercise those powers. The police officer must then either ensure that the documents are returned or seek authorisation from a senior police officer to retain the documents. Authorisation need not be in writing and may be granted if there are reasonable grounds for the suspicion that the individual is leaving or soon will leave the UK for involvement in terrorism-related activity.

4. If an authorisation is granted, the police officer would be able to retain the documents for 14 days while consideration is given to further action. After 72 hours of retention, a review of whether the authorisation was flawed would take place. The outcome of this review would be passed to the Chief Constable of the officer who requested the authorisation, who is entitled to take “whatever action seems appropriate”. At the end of 14 days, the documents may be further retained on application to a Magistrates Court, where an extension may be granted to take the total retention period up to thirty days. The judge must grant an extension if satisfied that those involved in deciding on further action have been acting diligently and expeditiously. The person concerned may make oral or written representations to the court and may be legally represented at the hearing; however the judge may exclude the person or their representative from any part of the hearing and on application from the senior police officer concerned order that information is withheld from the individual and their representative.

1 Schedule 1, paragraph 2(5)
2 Schedule 1, paragraph 2(1) and 2(2)
3 Schedule 1, paragraph 2(3)
4 Schedule 1, paragraph 4(1)
5 Schedule 1, paragraph 4(7)
6 Schedule 1, paragraph 5(1).
7 Schedule 1, paragraph 6(4)
8 Schedule 1, paragraph 8(1)
9 Schedule 1, paragraph 8(4)
10 Schedule 1, paragraph 9(1)
11 Schedule 1, paragraph 10(2)
5. The power can be used multiple times against the same person but where the powers in Schedule 1 have been exercised against the same person on two or more occasions in the previous six months, the 14 day retention period will be reduced to five days. It will be a criminal offence not to hand over travel documents or to obstruct or frustrate a search for travel documents. The power can be used against a UK national or a non-UK national and the Bill makes provision for the Home Secretary to provide those affected with food, accommodation and a defence to an immigration offence, presumably with foreign nationals in mind. There is also no age restriction on the power making it available for use against children, including foreign national children who may be traveling unaccompanied.

Discriminatory and ineffective

6. Stop and search powers have an uncomfortable history on the UK’s statute books. Evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that these type of powers are both framed and exercised in an overly-broad, discriminatory and ineffective manner. In its 2010 report into stop and search, the Equalities and Human Rights Commission recorded that “since 1995, per head of population in England and Wales, recorded stops and searches of Asian people have remained between 1.5 and 2.5 times the rate for White people, and for Black people always between 4 and 8 times the rate for White people.”

7. Under the broad stop and search power formerly contained in section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000, Black or Asian people were between five and seven times more likely to be stopped, and while this power was used to stop hundreds of thousands of people over its decade of existence, including journalists and peaceful protesters, none of them were ever convicted of a terrorism offence. The power was found to be unlawful by the Court of Human Rights, which found that section 44 breached the right to private life under Article 8 of the Convention and held that the potential for discriminatory use was “a very real consideration”. The power was subsequently repealed. Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act

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12 Schedule 1, paragraph 13(1)
13 Schedule 1, paragraph 15
14 Schedule 1, paragraph 1(7)
15 Schedule 1, paragraph 14
18 Gillan v UK, (Application no. 4158/05), European Court of Human Rights, paragraph 85
2000 still permits prolonged stop, search and detention at ports and borders for the purpose of establishing whether a person is a terrorist, without the requirement for individual suspicion. This power was used against Liberty client Mr Malik on his return from a package tour Hajj trip which he completed with his elderly mother. At the time of his stop, he had a chest and ear infection and was taking antibiotics, but nonetheless he was detained from 2.50pm until 7.20pm. During his detention he was referred to as a “prisoner”, his luggage was examined by two officers from Heathrow airport, his mobile phone, credit cards, bank details, underwear, clothes and work pass were all exposed, and his Qu’ran was hung upside down, shaken and flicked through. A Change.org petition calling on the Home Secretary to review Schedule 7 received over 70,000 signatures with the negative impact of the power on members of the Asian community well documented. Liberty is currently challenging the power to stop and search contained in Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act. It is difficult to see why this proposed new power will operate in a more successful and fair manner.

Reasonable suspicion

8. While the purported threshold for requesting papers or conducting a search will be “reasonable suspicion”, evidence demonstrates that in practice this offers little protection against arbitrary use of power. Stops under section 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 must be on the basis of reasonable suspicion, and yet HMIC recently recorded that in 27% of records they examined this standard was not met. In the immigration context in particular dubious guidance states that “reasonable suspicion” can be inferred from what seems to be normal behaviour. At Chapter 31 of the Home Office Enforcement Instructions and Guidance, the Department sets out the grounds on which it believes that reasonable suspicion can be formulated:

“Reasonable suspicion that an individual may be an immigration offender could arise in numerous ways but an example might be where an individual attempts to avoid passing through or near a group of IOs who are clearly visible, wearing branded Home Office clothing, at a location which has been targeted based on intelligence suggesting that there is a high likelihood that immigration offenders will be found there. This behaviour could not necessarily be considered to be linked to, for example, evading payment of the train fare if IOs are wearing vests or other items of work wear which clearly show which agency they belong to. In such circumstances the IO could legitimately stop the

19 HMIC, Stop and Search Powers: Are the police using them effectively and fairly?, page 6.
individual and ask consensual questions based on a reasonable suspicion that that person is an immigration offender.\textsuperscript{20}

With such lax rules in place, everyone becomes a suspect. The explanatory notes state that border force and immigration officers will have a one off staff training course lasting 1-3 hours.

9. There is also little indication that the random nature of stop and search, even with purported reasonable suspicion, yields effective results. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary recorded that most years since 2001 there have been over one million people stopped and searched, with only 9% subsequently arrested.\textsuperscript{21} Where the sanction is removal of passport, this fail rate is surely far too high. In addition to risking injustice on the individuals concerned, this type of approach will also serve to perpetuate a climate of fear and suspicion rather than encourage good relations between different communities within British society. The Home Secretary recently recognised the hugely prejudicial nature of stop and search powers and has sought to scale back their use. She stated: “Nobody wins when stop and search is misused. It can be an enormous waste of police time and damage the relationship between the public and police.”\textsuperscript{22} It appears odd, then, to legislate for this new stop and search type power when the problems it causes are clearly identified and it is contrary to the Home Secretary’s stop and search policy away from the borders.

\textit{Weak safeguards and secret courts}

10. The requirement that after 72 hours a senior police officer must conduct a review of the authorisation is not an effective safeguard. Travel will have already been prevented, possibly at huge cost to the individual concerned, and even if the review concludes that the authorisation should not have been granted, there is no requirement to return the passport to the individual concerned. This means that in the face of unlawful action by the police or immigration staff, there is no redress for the individual affected nor any way to guarantee that documents are returned with immediate effect. In addition, there is no limit on the amount of time the review may take.

\textsuperscript{20} Home Office Enforcement Guidance and Instructions, paragraph 31.19.4.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid, page 3.
11. Even more worrying is the purported judicial involvement which extends secret court procedures to proceedings in the Magistrates court. In determining whether a pre-arrest sanction can be extended for a further 14 days, a Magistrate can be required to exclude the individual concerned or their legal representative from the hearing or prevent them from seeing any purported evidence. In any event, the protection offered by this judicial process is meaningless, the Magistrate is only asked to determine whether those deciding on further action are acting expeditiously and diligently. This is not something that can be effectively challenged by the other side, even less so when they are shut out of the hearing. This fig leaf of judicial involvement co-opts the Court into a fundamentally unfair process and undermines the important role our courts play in upholding justice.

Already existing power of arrest

12. Liberty recognises that there will be situations in which it is necessary to prevent a person from leaving the country. However the police already have a tried and tested way to prevent a whole range of suspects from leaving the country – the power of arrest. Under section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000 the police have the power to arrest without warrant someone reasonably believed to be a terrorist. The broad definition of “terrorist” is contained in section 40 and section 1 of the Act. Arrest on suspicion of terrorism under section 41 triggers the potential for someone to be detained for up to 14 days pre-charge. In the ordinary course of things, the police have the power to release a suspect on conditional bail following arrest if there is insufficient evidence to charge. Police bail conditions can include passport surrender as well as a host of other restrictions including curfew, restrictions on contact, reporting requirements etc. However, currently, bail following arrest for an offence in the Terrorism Act 2000 cannot be granted by police. Liberty has long recommended that this bar on police bail in terrorism cases should be removed and it would be much simpler to include such a provision in this Bill rather than this convoluted passport detention scheme. This approach would deliver the same practical result as the Government seemingly wishes to achieve – preventing people leaving the country – but does so in a way that is much more robust with regard to both due process safeguards and keeping the rest of the population safe.

23 In addition to the power of arrest, section 43 of the 2000 Act also provides a power of stop and search on reasonable suspicion of terrorism. Similarly, Schedule 7 of the Act, which applies at ports and borders, allows for an examining officer (constable, immigration officer or customs officer) to stop, question and detain someone for the purposes of determining whether they are a terrorist in circumstances where no individual suspicion exists.
13. Using the power of arrest also sends a very clear message to those who may be considering leaving the country to participate in terrorism that such an action is exceptionally grave, criminal, and will be treated with the utmost seriousness. For some young or confused individuals, this strong message may be sufficient to make them reconsider their plans. The message sent by passport confiscation is significantly weaker.

**Temporary Exclusion from the United Kingdom**

14. Part 1, Chapter 2 of the Bill sets out a mechanism for executive imposed invalidation of the passports of those outside of the UK. Temporary Exclusion Orders (TEOs) would be imposed at the imperative of the Home Secretary where she “reasonably suspects” an individual outside the UK is or has been involved in activity related to terrorism.\(^{24}\) Terrorism-related activity includes any assistance given to another believed by an individual to be instigating or preparing acts of terrorism. TEOs can be imposed on anybody with a right of abode in the UK, but they would only act to invalidate a British passport. A TEO prevents an individual from returning to the UK unless he is deported by the state in which he is currently located, or he obtains a permit to return. TEOs last for renewable periods of 2 years. Although there is a requirement that individuals be notified of the imposition of a TEO, there is no detail about how notice would be served and the practical reality of alerting an individual who may be in a country in the midst of internal armed conflict remains unaddressed.

15. For those individuals who become aware that they are under a TEO, either because they are effectively served notice or they are prevented from travelling, a permit to return (“a permit”) is required to re-enter the UK. Permits are issued by the Home Secretary. She would be required to issue one where an individual is subject to deportation, she may further issue one on her initiative where she considers that the urgency of the situation renders it expedient.\(^{25}\) Otherwise an application for a permit must be made by the individual. The Secretary of State is only obliged to issue one if an individual attends a specified interview. The permit must make specific provision about the time, manner and place of return. Return

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\(^{24}\) Sub-clause 2(3). Terrorism-related activity is defined at sub-clause 11(4) as the commission, preparation or instigation of terrorist acts, conduct that facilitates or encourages such commission, preparation or instigation or conduct that provides support or assistance to somebody known or believed to be involved in the commission, preparation or instigation of terrorist acts.

\(^{25}\) Sub-clause 6(2).
must be facilitated within a “reasonable time” following an application. The term “reasonable time” is left open to interpretation: there is no time limit.

16. If an individual subject to a TEO is granted a permit, on returning to the UK the Secretary of State may place the individual, by notice, under obligations to report to a police station, attend appointments and give address details (“section 8 obligations”). It is an offence to attempt to re-enter the country in breach of a TEO (i.e. without a permit) or to breach any section 8 obligation.27

17. When giving evidence to the JCHR immediately before the publication of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, the Reviewer of Counter-Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson QC, described the Government’s much touted exclusion orders as “an announcement waiting for a policy”.28 At different times, the Government has argued both that the TEO scheme would provide a “discretionary power to allow us to exclude British nationals from the UK”29 and that it would simply “control the return of a UK citizen”.30 Neither statement paints the full picture and the confused policy which has emerged in this Bill offers the worst of both worlds. The orders do not simply control the manner of return. Return will be prevented for those who may be practically unable to apply for a permit. Those without sufficient money or means, those being controlled by another or resident in a failed or failing State. A permit may be refused to a person who fails to attend an interview, whether by accident or design. An individual unwilling or unable to attend an interview or return in the manner prescribed by the Home Secretary may not return to the UK. Even in those cases where an individual complies with the requirement to attend an interview, he will still be trapped in a foreign jurisdiction at the Home Secretary’s pleasure. Conversely, the Bill does not ultimately prevent return by those willing to comply. For those who genuinely seek to do us harm, the system of TEOs, permits and section 8 reporting obligations will offer few obstacles.

Unsafe

18. If the ultimate objective of the Government is to exclude citizens it believes to be dangerous by reintroducing a form of medieval exile, the policy will not assist. A determined

26 Sub-clause 5(3).
27 Sub-clause 9(1).
29 The Prime Minister, Hansard 1 Sep2014: Column 26.
30 Home Secretary, Speech on Counter-Terrorism, 24th November.
terrorist seeking to plot murder and mayhem is unlikely to be phased by the prospect of an interview prior to return to the UK. Provided he attends, the Home Secretary is obliged to issue a travel document. A stipulation that he return on a certain flight to a certain airport, will ensure that the Agencies and police know of an individual’s location should they wish to surveil him, but the same outcome is achieved through placing a simple notification requirement on carriers. If the Government genuinely seeks a ‘managed return’, a targeted, intelligence-led system of notification would avoid the obvious principled and practical problems, discussed in more detail below, of a policy of extra-territorial, executive passport invalidation. The individual could then be interviewed on their arrival in the UK under existing counter-terrorism powers allowing any further necessary action – by way of surveillance or criminal proceedings – to be taken as appropriate. Ultimately the only action which will neutralise the threat is intelligence gathering, including by close surveillance of suspects, in pursuit of arrests and prosecutions. The TEO scheme frustrates these objectives by notifying a dangerous person that he is of interest to the authorities, potentially driving his activities further underground.

19. The TEO scheme further involves a period of temporary, enforced residence in a foreign jurisdiction. This could be any country in the world and in the short to medium term the power could feasibly be used against British citizens present in countries such as Turkey, Iraq, Kenya, Sudan, Somalia, Syria, Algeria, Mali, Nigeria. It is difficult to see how a proposal which temporarily traps an individual in a region where jihadi groups have a strong presence will further the core objective identified to the ISC by SIS of breaking the link between UK extremists and terror groups in foreign countries. Those who are equivocal are more likely to be pushed towards terrorist factions by the imposition of executive led punishments and enforced periods in close proximity to such groups. Liberty is also concerned by evidence that MI6 views the fact that a suspect is outside the jurisdiction as a solution to the immediate threat, absolving it of responsibility for ongoing investigation. The ISC raised this concern in their recent report, stating

“The Committee therefore finds SIS’s apparent lack of interest in Adebolajo’s arrest [in Kenya] deeply unsatisfactory: on this occasion, SIS’s role in countering ‘jihadi tourism’ does not appear to have extended to any practical action being taken.” (Recommendation H).  

32 ISC Report, page 26, recommendation G.
20. The most fundamental practical problem with the TEO scheme is that it ignores the fact that those who threaten our security do not respect national borders and violent crimes can be plotted, terrorist training gained, the aims of terrorist organisations furthered by an individual regardless of whether they have a valid British passport or Home Secretary authorisation to travel. Draconian immigration or travel measures will never provide an answer to sophisticated networks of ideologically driven criminality. The ISC report made a series of detailed recommendations for improving the Security Services’ internal operation particularly in relation to its involvement with British citizens outside of the jurisdiction. It is resolving these systemic failures that will facilitate more effective investigation, ultimately increasing the likelihood of successful prosecutions. Further, whilst dangerous terrorists will remain a threat to this country wherever in the world they are, if they return they are far more susceptible to close monitoring with the ultimate aim of prosecution.

Human rights violations

21. The TEO scheme is as problematic for what it does not contain as for what it dictates. No provision is made in the Bill for the period between an individual becoming aware of the TEO and their possible return at a time of the Secretary of State’s choosing. Those jurisdictions where the power is most likely to be invoked are widely known to practice torture of terrorism suspects. The prohibition on torture, inhuman and degrading treatment is absolute. Just as the Government is prevented from deporting foreign nationals, in circumstances where there is a real risk of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, Executive invalidation of a passport which prevents an individual departing from a place where they face a real risk of torture will breach the State’s human rights obligations.

22. The ISC report and subsequent media reports once again point to the continuing complicity of the Security Services in the torture of British residents overseas. Michael Adebolajo claims that he was mistreated by the Kenyan authorities during a period of detention and threatened with rape and electrocution. The ISC identified a series of problems with the way in which these claims were handled by the Agencies. In evidence, SIS told the ISC that it did not know of Adebolajo’s detention in Kenya; the ISC found that “SIS had been told that a British citizen was being held in detention: therefore they did know that “it was going on”. 33 MI6 was at pains to demonstrate why the Government’s ‘Consolidated Guidance to Intelligence Officers and Service Personnel on the Detention and

33 ISC Report, paragraph 466.
Interviewing of Detainees Overseas’ did not apply to Adebolajo’s detention and ultimately to extricate itself from any responsibility for his treatment.

23. A subsequent investigation by the Independent on Sunday has reported that the ISC has been misled and that the MI6 was actually responsible for, and through British special forces involved with, Adebolajo’s arrest in snatch operation with the Kenyan counter-terrorism police. A well placed security source is reported as saying:

“An awful lot of people were mortified when Rigby was killed…The plan to recruit Adebolajo to work for our side was based on the hope he was so grateful to get out of Kenyan custody he would be easy to turn. We didn’t know what exactly would happen to him when he was interrogated [in Kenya] and of course we can’t be seen to condone anything other than the highest standards. On the other hand it’s always useful to have the intelligence that results from that sort of questioning.” 34

24. Liberty considers it a very real possibility that those whose passports are invalidated and become caught up in the permit application process will be held in detention by a host state such as Turkey or Kenya. In its latest report on Kenya, the UN Committee Against Torture wrote:

“the Committee notes with deep concern the numerous and consistent allegations of widespread use of torture and ill-treatment of suspects in police custody.” 35

Of Turkey, the UN Committee Against Torture wrote:

“The Committee is gravely concerned about numerous, ongoing and consistent allegations concerning the use of torture, particularly in unofficial places of detention including in police vehicles, on the street and outside police stations…” 36

25. Those in the hands of the Turkish and Kenyan Governments will be vulnerable to torture. There has still been no independent, judge led inquiry into allegations of UK complicity in rendition and torture and the latest evidence reveals the practice is continuing. The TEO policy carries clear echoes of the worst excesses of the war on terror, raising the spectre of secretive alliances with regimes that routinely flout international law through torture and extra-judicial killing.

34 The Independent, ‘Lee Rigby murder: Were we told the whole truth?’, Sunday 30th November.  
36 UN Committee Against Torture Report, Forty-fifth session, 1–19 November 2010, paragraph 7.
26. A policy which prevents British citizens from returning to this country, for any period, throws up further principled and practical concerns. During the period between passport invalidation and the conditional return date, the individual is – for all practical purposes – stripped of citizenship. In the case of dual nationals stripped of British citizenship under current powers whilst abroad, there is chilling evidence that they have fallen victim to extra-judicial killing or been effectively kidnapped by the US authorities without any form of due process. A troubling lack of transparency on the part of Government around the plight of those deprived of British citizenship, means the information we do have is largely attributable to freedom of information requests and the efforts of investigative journalists. The work of the Bureau of Investigative journalism has revealed that the deaths of British-Lebanese citizen Bilal al-Berlawi and British-Egyptian Mohamed Sakr in US drone strikes followed shortly after the men were stripped of British nationality. The Government has chosen to “neither confirm nor deny” the allegation that it shares the information with the Americans for the purpose of facilitating drone strikes.

27. Liberty is deeply concerned by policies of exceptionality which impose arbitrary punishments on individuals at moments of extreme vulnerability, by-passing due process safeguards. We now have a plethora of terrorism offences on the statute book, including offences which criminalise training or fighting with terror groups abroad. Further, the Government’s most recent criminal justice Bill, the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill, increases the maximum sentences for a number of terrorism-related offences to life imprisonment and introduces a restrictive parole regime to offences of this nature. In the words of the late Lord Kingsland, former Conservative Shadow Lord Chancellor:

“Why should such a person not be prosecuted in the normal way in our criminal courts instead? Why on earth should the Secretary of State be given this discretion to pick somebody out of the normal judicial process and deal with him by his own subjective judgement.”

28. Liberty understands the importance of international intelligence operations to the fight against terrorism. We further understand that this requires systems of notification, which place obligations on carriers to alert the UK authorities of the international movements of suspects. On return, suspects can be subjected more easily to close surveillance and arrests

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37 Bureau of Investigative Journalism, Former British citizens killed by drone strikes after passports revoked, Chris Woods and Alice K.Ross, 27th February 2013.
and prosecutions carried out where possible. A working intelligence model is not served by preventing the movement of suspects; it is served by knowledge of their movements. A system of this nature can be achieved without resorting to the dangerous and arbitrary powers proposed in this Bill.

**Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs)**

29. Part 2 covers reforms to the TPIMs regime and introduces some new and some old measures. The controversial legislation, due to expire in 2016, already allows the Home Secretary to impose a wide range of punitive restrictions on individuals, entirely outside of the criminal justice system, on the basis of reasonable belief of their involvement in terrorism-related activity. These include overnight curfews, exclusion from certain places or buildings, restrictions on travel, meetings, work, study, contact with others, use of phones, computers etc, access to financial services, daily reporting at a police station and GPS monitoring.

30. Clause 12 amends the ‘overnight residence measure’ and would allow the Home Secretary to require individuals to live in a residence and locality in the UK that she considers appropriate. This power will allow individuals to be removed from their family and community and placed in effective isolation in a town or city that they may have never been to. It was a feature of the old Control Order regime and, for obvious reasons, was its most punishing and unjust measure. In a number of cases before the regime’s demise, the courts quashed control orders or found them to be unlawful on the basis that internal exile, in conjunction with other restrictions imposed, amounted to a violation of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as incorporated by the Human Rights Act (HRA). In the leading Supreme Court case on the issue in 2010, a control order imposing a 150 mile relocation requirement and a 16 hour curfew was ruled unlawful as a result of the detainee’s dramatically reduced contact with family and severe social isolation. This judgment confirmed that the decision as to whether an order is lawful will turn on the impact of the overall package of measures on a detainee. In another relocation case that reached the High Court in 2010, the Court upheld an appeal against an order that also included a 150 mile relocation requirement and had the effect of separating a man from his wife and two

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40 Under the Bill’s provisions, if an individual has a residence at the time when the TPIM is served then the Home Secretary cannot move them further than 200 miles from their residence without the individual’s agreement. It is unclear when an individual will be deemed to have their own residence – whether they have to own their own property or whether a tenancy counts.

children. In this case Mr Justice Mitting further ruled, on the basis of evidence provided by the detainee’s wife, that the threat he posed would actually be reduced if he were able to remain with his family. Re-introduction of the relocation requirement will undoubtedly result in more unjust, counterproductive and unlawful orders being imposed. The security risk of leaving those suspected of terrorist intent in the community and antagonising and punishing them with enforced separation from their families is clear. Renewed legal challenges to the system of internal exile will come at considerable cost to the public purse. Following a judgment of the Court of Appeal in 2010, it is also possible that those whose orders are quashed may be able to claim compensation.

31. Clause 13 extends “travel measures”. These can currently be imposed by the Home Secretary to prevent people leaving the UK, Great Britain or Northern Ireland but clause 13(5) amends this to include “any area within the UK that includes the place where the individual will be living”. This power will prevent individuals from leaving their immediate locality – the geographical extent of the power is left undefined. Clause 13 further removes the defence of ‘reasonable excuse’ for those who breach TPIMs by leaving the UK and increases the maximum sentence for breach to 10 years imprisonment. Criminalisation of those that breach an Executive imposed civil sanction turns our justice system on its head. This was recognised by the jury who heard the criminal case brought against Cerie Bullivant, prosecuted for seven control order breaches after he went on the run. The jury acquitted him on all charges. A ten year prison sentence is longer than those routinely handed down to serious violent offenders. It will be available for those who may never have been arrested, let alone convicted for a terrorism offence.

32. Clause 14 adds a “weapons and explosives measure” which empowers the Home Secretary to prohibit a TPIM subject from making an application to police for a firearms

44 AN & Others [2010] EWCA Civ 869.
certificate and possessing offensive weapons, imitation firearms and explosives. It is entirely sensible that people the authorities suspect of involvement in terrorism do not have access to firearms but it is also a revealing indictment of the internal chaos of the regime and lack of monitoring that the Home Secretary fears a firearms certificate may be granted by police. Clause 15 adds an “appointments measure” to the range of TPIMs restrictions available. The Home Secretary will have the power to require that an individual attends appointments with specified persons and complies with her “reasonable directions” relating to matters that are the subject of the appointment.

33. Clause 16 raises the threshold for imposing a TPIM from “reasonably believes” to “is satisfied on the balance of probabilities” of past or current involvement in terrorism-related activity. This is a minor concession. The explanatory notes state that the Government considers that the balance of probabilities threshold has been met in all TPIMs cases to date. However, the secrecy that engulfs the system means that wherever the threshold is set, the ‘evidence’ justifying imposition is not subject to effective challenge and there is no requirement for it to be grounded in verifiable fact – it can be based on unchallenged hearsay, conjecture and intelligence obtained by torture elsewhere in the world.

34. On any objective assessment control orders and TPIMs have failed as a public policy measure. Far from being a ‘temporary but necessary’ central plank of our counter-terror strategy, the measures have been circumvented by some and have acted as a visible symbol of injustice and cause of resentment for others. They have been relatively little used as a result of human rights rulings in the courts and they have never led to a terrorism-related prosecution. In January this year the JCHR said “we are left with the impression that in practice TPIMs may be withering on the vine as a counter-terrorism tool of practical utility” and recommended that the next Government urgently review the powers to allow “Parliament to make a fully informed decision about the continued necessity of the powers at that time”. Liberty understands that there is currently only one individual subject to a TPIM.

Unsafe

35. The rate of absconds undermines any security claims made for this policy. Seven of the 48 individuals subject to control orders absconded. Two TPIM subjects have
absconded. As the JCHR has noted “the very nature of a TPIM carries an inherent risk of the subject absconding”. While relocation may make absconds marginally less likely, without 24 hour surveillance, it will remain a possibility for those determined not to comply with the punishing measures. If 24 hour surveillance is to be applied, why not monitor the suspect for evidence gathering purposes without tipping them off?

36. TPIMs further undermine security by acting as an impediment to prosecution. In 2010/2011 former DPP, Lord Macdonald QC oversaw the Home Office review of counter-terrorism and security powers and concluded -

“The evidence obtained by the Review has plainly demonstrated that the present control order regime acts as an impediment to prosecution. It places those suspected of involvement in terrorist activity squarely in an evidence limbo: current control powers can relocate suspects and place them under curfews for up to 16 hours a day, they can forbid suspects from meeting and speaking with other named individuals, from travelling to particular places, and from using telephones and the internet. In other words, controls may be imposed that precisely prevent those very activities that are apt to result in the discovery of evidence fit for prosecution, conviction and imprisonment.”

He further reported -

“We may safely assume that if the Operation Overt (airline) plotters had, in the earliest stages of their conspiracy, been placed on control orders and subjected to the full gamut of conditions available under the present legislation, they would be living amongst us still, instead of sitting for very long years in the jail cells where they belong.”

It was claimed that TPIMs would better reconcile the public policy aim of prosecution with preventative detention. However the JCHR reported earlier this year that it “failed to find any evidence that TPIMs have led in practice to any more criminal prosecutions for terrorism

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46 Ibrahim Magag absconded on 26 December 2012 and Mohammed Ahmed Mohamed on 1 November 2013. As far as we are aware neither has been found.
49 Ibid.
In their view TPIMs are not investigatory in meaningful any sense and they recommended that their name should be changed as the “epithet ‘TPIMS’ is a misnomer”.

Creating conditions for alienation resentment, and radicalisation

37. TPIMs can have a devastating impact on those subject to them and their families and can undermine long-term security by alienating communities and the next generation. The JCHR has highlighted evidence provided by Cage Advocacy on the impact of TPIMs. In particular that detainees and their families were reporting a heightened sense of hopelessness, isolation and worthlessness; poor communication between government agencies made prolonged unemployment amongst detainees inevitable; police heavy handed responses to unintentional technical breaches re-traumatised family members; measures were having a profoundly detrimental impact on detainees and families mental health including severe depression, anxiety and trauma and seriously damaging relationships. The JCHR was particularly concerned about “the significant impact of TPIMs upon [family members] and the risk of creating new generation susceptible to the influence of extremist narratives.”

38. The wife of former ‘controlee’ Abu Rideh has spoken of the traumatic impact that her husband’s control order has had on her life and those of her children –

My husband was a wreck, a shattered man. He could not sleep, he would sweat and shake, he would have nightmares and flashbacks. It was almost impossible to deal with him. He was ill and had complex psychological needs – I am not a trained nurse and he required specialist help. One week later he attempted suicide by taking an overdose of his depression and anti-psychotic medications. I found him on the floor unconscious, in a pool of vomit foam coming from his mouth. He was taken to the hospital and remained unconscious for three days. My life is ruined. I cannot sleep. I cry so much. It is having an effect on my children. …I am British. So are my children. Why, then, is it acceptable for us to be treated in this manner? The police came many times to search my house, violating the sanctity that is a home. What do they expect to find among my clothes and my children’s clothes? 

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50 Ibid at footnote 47.
51 Ibid, para 78.
39. As well as impacting family members, TPIMs are made against those that pose no direct threat to the British public, exacerbating the potential for increased alienation and radicalisation. Following the TPIM absconds in 2012 and 2013 the Home Secretary made clear in her respective statements just how loosely the measures are applied. Parliament was told that the first abscondee was “not considered to represent a direct threat to the British public. The TPIM notice in this case was intended primarily to prevent fundraising and overseas travel”53 and in relation to the second abscondee that “the police and security service have confirmed that they do not believe [he] poses a direct threat to the public in the UK. The reason he was out on a TPIM in the first place was to prevent his travelling to support terrorism overseas”54

Data Retention

40. Part 3 of the Bill amends the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 agreed between the leaders of the three main parties in July and pushed through Parliament in under a week. It amends section 2(1) of the Act to extend the Home Secretary’s blanket power to require communications companies retain communications data held for billing purposes for 12 months and gives her the power to require retention of “relevant internet data”. Relevant internet data is defined as data which “relates to an internet service or an internet communications service, may be used to identify or assist in identifying, which internet protocol address or other identifier belongs to the sender or recipient of a communication and is not data which (i) maybe used to identify an internet communications service to which a communication is transmitted through an internet access service for the purpose of obtaining access to or running a computer file or program and (ii) is generated or processed by a public telecommunications operator in the process of supplying the internet access service to the sender of the communication”. This power is being claimed to help link the unique attributes of an IP address to the person or device using it at any given time. The definition given to “internet data” includes data required to identify the sender or recipient (which could include identification and storage of email addresses; port numbers; usernames); the time and duration of communications; the type, method or pattern of a communication; the telecommunications system used or the location of such a telecommunications system. We understand that the definition specifically excludes the retention of web logs (e.g. the specific internet pages that individuals are viewing). Part 3 is due to expire at the end of 2016 at the same time as the DRIPA.

53 HC Deb 8 Jan 2013 col 161
54 HC Deb 4 Nov 2013 col 23.
41. It is unclear from the broad drafting of the provisions and the pithy explanatory notes whether this power would permit full deep packet inspection (i.e. interception) of all UK communications in order to identify and retain the identifying data sought. If it does, the power in the Bill will be a lot closer to the Snoopers’ Charter legislation previously rejected by Parliament following pre-legislative scrutiny in 2013.\(^{55}\)

42. What is clear is that the approach taken in the legislation mirrors the blanket powers sought under DRIPA which replicated powers previously ruled unlawful by the European Court of Justice in the Digital Rights Ireland case in April this year.\(^{56}\) The Court held that indiscriminate powers to require the retention of the communications data of the entire population amounted to a violation of privacy rights. The Court set out criteria for compliance with fundamental rights standards and made clear that such powers needed to be linked to suspicion of serious criminality and subject to geographical and time limits. DRIPA is currently being challenged by way of a judicial review claim brought by MPs David Davis and Tom Watson.\(^{57}\)

43. Part 3 will, for the first time, allow the State to require British communications service providers to retain communications information on the British population that they don’t already retain for billing purposes, just in case that information is in future useful for law enforcement. This is a major step change in relationship between the individual and the State. It is an abdication of constitutional responsibility for the Executive to seek to rush through further surveillance legislation without a proper explanation of the terms and definitions used, the technical capacity it will create and its practical impact.

**Authority to carry**

44. Part 4 of the Bill repeals existing powers permitting the creation of authority to carry scheme set out in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Replacement provision allows for the creation of authority to carry schemes which apply in relation to both inbound and outbound flights and to British citizens as well as foreign nationals. As under the old

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\(^{56}\) Digital Rights Ireland (C-293/12) and Seitlinger and Others (C-594/12)

scheme, the Secretary of State can prescribe that all carriers, or certain categories of carrier, must seek her permission before carrying all passengers or a sub-class defined on grounds such as nationality.\footnote{Sub-clause 18(2)(b).} In a departure from the old scheme the new provision allows the Home Secretary to earmark whole categories of passenger for refusal of authority-to-carry where “necessary in the public interest”.\footnote{Sub-clause 18(2)(c).} Clause 18(5) further requires the Home Secretary to detail how requests for authority are made by carriers and answered by the Secretary of State, this may include a requirement to provide information at a specified time prior to an individual’s travel and to require carriers to provide or receive information in a particular manner or form.\footnote{Sub-clause 18(2)(c).} The information that may be required under an authority-to-carry scheme includes all passenger information held by carriers (e.g. names, travel information, payment details, meal requirements) lists of passengers travelling and information relating to the journey itself. Provision is made for information to be supplied to the Home Secretary, an immigration officer or the police.\footnote{In accordance with powers set out at sub-clause 18(6).}

45. The detail of the scheme or schemes the Secretary of State may seek to create is left to secondary legislation. Carriers who convey without seeking authority (where required) or who convey an individual after authority has been denied face civil penalties to be set out in regulations.

46. Liberty does not object to a system which requires carriers to notify the authorities in this country when named suspects seek passage to or from the UK, we further do not object to a requirement that this happen prior to travel. Intelligence gathering in a world where travel is easy and terrorist groups operate in sophisticated international networks, knowledge of the movements of suspect is a vital piece of the intelligence picture, which requires the co-operation of carriers. We are deeply concerned, however, about measures which involve casting suspicion on entire classes of people on the basis of features such as nationality, or potentially religion. This is not targeted surveillance of suspect individuals: it is crude stereotyping. It is particularly concerning to see a provision which allows the Home Secretary to designate whole categories of individual as “categories in respect of whom authority may be refused”.\footnote{Sub-clause 18(2)(c).} It is hard to see how this policy could be operated without serious discriminatory impact, creating feelings of marginalisation and alienation amongst targeted communities.
47. For the same reasons that Liberty objects to TEOs which prevent, at least temporary, re-entry into the country, we have serious concerns about authority-to-carry schemes in so far as they prevent travel temporarily or permanently (where authority is refused). For those individuals genuinely suspected of seeking to travel abroad to engage in terrorist activity, the appropriate response is not passport seizure, nor is it requiring a carrier to refuse passage. The only effective response is notification by carriers that an individual seeks to travel, to facilitating ongoing surveillance and investigation or arrest. Forcing a hostile individual to remain in this country, but refusing to deal with him through the criminal justice system is obviously dangerous. Similarly trapping a dangerous individual outside of the UK will not neutralise their criminal intent. Simply preventing travel is not the answer. The system as described is likely to be operated in a lax and ill-targeted way, catching and arbitrarily punishing many innocent people on grounds as crude as nationality. For the genuinely dangerous, the most that will be achieved is temporary frustration: the underlying threat will remain.

Risk of Being Drawn Into Terrorism

48. The Bill creates a statutory terrorism prevention duty for a whole range of public bodies. Clause 21 establishes a duty on a specified authority to “have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism” in the exercise of its functions. Schedule 3 lists the authorities to which this applies, which includes local councils, prison governors, universities, schools, nursery schools, NHS Trusts, chief constables, etc. The Home Secretary can add to this list via Regulations but certain bodies are precluded from having this duty namely the security services and the Ministry of Defence. The duty also does not apply to the “exercise of a judicial function”. Specified authorities must have regard to published guidance (and any revised guidance) issued by the Home Secretary about the exercise of their duty. If satisfied that a particular organisation has failed to discharge its duty, Ministers may give directions to the authority to enforce the performance of that duty. The Home Secretary can apply to the courts to have a direction enforced by a mandatory order.

49. Liberty believes that prevention is an incredibly important part of counter-terrorism work. However - chief constables and prison governors aside - we do not believe that placing a broad and vague statutory obligation on public bodies to this end will achieve results. The ISC report into the murderous attack on Fusilier Lee Rigby concluded that Government’s Prevent programme is not working. The increase in the threat from terrorism
over the past 13 years suggests the same. The Communities and Local Government Committee concluded in their inquiry into Prevent in 2010 that the proliferation of the counter-terror agenda had created a climate in which members of the Muslim community feel labelled as potential terrorists in all aspects of their life in the community.\textsuperscript{63} It is odd therefore that instead of reviewing the programme the Government instead seeks to put it on a statutory footing.

50. The statutory obligation will create a bureaucratic nightmare for hundreds of public bodies now presumably required to have counter-terrorism prevention policies regardless of their suitability or relevance to law enforcement. The clause contains no detail on the content of the duty which will presumably be set by Government via guidance and later, directions. Based on the operation of Prevent to date, it is conceivable that it will be regarded as placing reporting and surveillance obligations on organisations. Further, granting Ministers the power to issue directions to nurseries, schools, universities or NHS Trusts they believe have failed, opens the door for unprecedented direct political involvement in the running and operation of these institutions. The directions that could be given are unlimited in scope and could presumably include anything from which student groups should be allowed to exist at a University campus to which external speakers can and cannot be invited. It is unclear what guidance and directions could possibly be given to nurseries.

51. Liberty believes that Prevent is misconceived in its core remit. As a strategy supposedly aimed at preventing radicalisation and bringing those at the margins back into mainstream society, we have seen first-hand how its operation has been counterproductive. One of the most problematic elements of the programme has been the clumsy way in which counter-terror prevention has been incorporated into public service institutions causing a combination of offence, mistrust, division and further alienation. Another key problem with Prevent has been the way in which it has mixed community outreach with surveillance. The Institute for Race Relations has highlighted the use of Prevent funding for a youth centre aimed at Muslims in a town in the North of England with the appearance of a straightforward recreational facility. It became apparent however that the inclusion of free IT facilities provided an opportunity for monitoring the web use of young people and one of the stated rationales for the centre was “intelligence gathering”.\textsuperscript{64} Project Champion, which saw a CCTV ring of steel placed around a Muslim community in Birmingham, is another example of

\textsuperscript{63} House of Commons Community and Local Government Committee ‘Preventing Violent Extremism: Sixth Report of Session 2009-2010.

duplicitous State intervention. In the external report on the doomed venture, the Chief Constable of Thames Valley, Sara Thornton, confirmed that the project was falsely sold to the Muslim community as a general crime prevention measure when it was purely a counter-terrorism surveillance exercise. She further concluded that community trust and confidence was undermined as a result. Formalising the supposed counter-terror prevention work of myriad public bodies will likely increase the incidence and perception of discriminatory and offensive stereotyping. Instead the Government should focus on projects to support vulnerable young people excluded from mainstream society and provide funds for credible grassroots organisations with a proven track record for effective youth work.

52. Clauses 28-33 would require local authorities to set up Local Panels to assess and prepare support plans for identified individuals. Chief constables can refer individuals to the Panel if there are reasonable grounds to believe the individual is “vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism”. “Support” is provided if consent to the plan is given by the individual (if over 18) or by their parents (if the individual is under 18). The panel must have regard to Home Secretary guidance. Membership of the Panel includes local authorities, police and anyone else the local authority considers appropriate. Where the panel is unable to reach a unanimous decision it must make decisions by majority vote. Partners of Local Panels are under a duty to co-operate with Panels. Partners can include Ministers, Government departments, other local authorities and police forces; prison/YOI/STC secure college governors, universities, sixth form colleges; schools; nurseries; children’s homes; fostering agencies; NHS Trusts and clinical commissioning groups etc.

53. These clauses purport to put “Channel” on a statutory footing. However while the Bill puts local panels on a statutory footing, Liberty understands that another aspect of Channel is to encourage teachers, healthcare staff and others involved in the delivery of public services to report their students and patients to the police. Liberty has been contacted over the years by professionals concerned at the guidance issued to them by the Home Office. Past guidance has included broad categories of suggested “vulnerabilities” that caregivers are asked to look out as signs of radicalisation. These can include someone’s religion, foreign policy views, a distrust of civil society and ‘mental health’. While everyone in society has moral and ethical obligations to report suspected criminality, requiring teachers and others in sensitive positions of trust to report those with dissenting views risks undermining professional obligations of confidentiality, sewing mistrust and pushing those with grievances.

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further underground. Liberty is concerned that the general duty to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism in clause 21 of the Bill may be used as a basis to require reporting from teachers and others.

**Insurance against payments made in response to terrorist demands**

54. It is an offence under section 17 of the *Terrorism Act 2000* for a person to enter into or becomes concerned in an arrangement as a result of which money or other property is made available to another person when the money is then to be used for the purposes of terrorism. Clause 34 adds section 17 A to the Terrorism Act, creating two criminal offences for insurers who pay out on contracts for money which has been used by an insured person to pay a ransom.

**Power to examine goods**

55. Clause 35 and Schedule 5 make amendments to paragraph 9, Schedule 7 of the *Terrorism Act 2000*. Paragraph 9, Schedule 7 permits the examination of goods for the purpose of determining whether they have been used in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism. There is no requirement for this examination to be on the basis of any suspicion.  

56. Schedule 5 would make a number of changes to the operation of this power. First, it would increase the categories of good which can be subject to the power, extending it to include items travelling from one place in the UK to another. Second, it increases the number of places where a search of goods may take place - such as storage facilities and premises owned by shipping or air companies – and gives the Secretary of State power to designate other premises where searches may take place in future. Third, it then exempts any of these searches from requiring a warrant under the *Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000* and changes the *Postal Services Act 2000* to state that mail may be intercepted under this power.

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66 *Terrorism Act, Schedule 7, Paragraph 2(9)*
67 Schedule 5, paragraph 1(2)
68 Schedule 5, paragraph 1(2)
69 Schedule 5, paragraph 2
70 Schedule 5, paragraph 3
57. This would mean that the State would have power to search all letters moving in or out of the country or between different parts of the country without requiring a warrant giving them permission to do so. This is a mass violation of the right to respect for private life and correspondence, as enshrined in Article 8 of the ECHR. There are a number of serious problems with the RIPA regime, however one of the last remaining safeguards for surveillance contained in the system of warrants would be circumvented by this power. Earlier in the year Members of Parliament from all sides of the House acknowledged that the regime for interception of communications is in need of reform. With cross-party agreement, Parliament set up in statute an inquiry into interception and communications data legislation, and this review is currently being conducted by the Government Reviewer of Terrorism, David Anderson QC.\(^1\) It is astonishing that the Government now seeks to pre-empt the conclusions of that review and to legislate for greater powers to read the letters of everyone in the country, without suspicion and without any specific authorisation. Not content with the blanket power for the secret services to mass intercept all external emails, phone calls, messages and webchats without parliamentary approval via its TEMPORA programme, it now asks Parliament to sanction a blanket power to read all of our letters, birthday cards, bills and bank statements too.

**Clause 36: Privacy and Civil Liberties Board**

58. Clause 36 would allow the Secretary of State to establish via statutory instrument a body to give advice and assistance to the Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. It is stipulated that such a body would be chaired by the Reviewer of Terrorism and would be known as the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board. All other details – such as membership, appointment, reporting and powers or limitations of the Board - would be set out in regulations.

59. In the absence of any information concerning the Board and the work that it would be entitled to do, it is very difficult to comment on whether this will be an effective innovation. We note that the Government originally announced that the Board would replace the Reviewer of Terrorism. It appears that the Reviewer has now been retained in post, and will now chair this Board instead. Liberty has expressed significant concerns in the past over the mission creep of the Reviewer role. Statutorily authorised to report on the operation of counter-terrorism legislation, the role has expanded to one of commenting on proposed policy and legislation and providing commentary in the media. The role is commonly referred to as the “Independent Reviewer” yet it is a job appointed and renewed by the Home

\(^1\) Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014, section 7(1)
Secretary and funded by Government. We expect that, like many of the post facto oversight mechanisms in place, the Privacy & Civil Liberties Board will lack the independence, expertise and transparency necessary to act as an effective check. In the surveillance sphere, prior judicial authorisation of interception and requests for communications data is the only effective and truly independent form of oversight.

**Alternative policies to the Counter-Terrorism & Security Bill**

60. While there is no simple answer to the complex problem which international terrorism presents, there are alternatives to this Bill which would be far more effective in terms of countering the extremist narrative and securing effective surveillance, investigations and prosecutions.

**Learning the lessons of the ISC report**

(i) “Low-priority” suspects

61. Much of the ISC’s criticism of the Agencies in its recent report focused on processes for dealing with those suspects who may appear on the peripheries of several investigations, associating with other “subjects of interest” and involving themselves with groups believed to have criminal, extremist intent. The ISC suggested that further intrusive investigation would be justified in these circumstances, noting that in the case of Adebolajo, internal MI5 recommendations for further investigation were apparently ignored due to resource issues.

62. More broadly, the handling of “low priority” individuals by the Agencies and police was found to be seriously lacking:

“Clearly, MI5 must focus on the highest priority individuals. However, that leaves a large group of individuals who may pose a threat to national security, but who are not under active investigation. Previous attempts by MI5 and police to manage this group have failed: we have yet to see any evidence that the new programme, established in late 2013 will be any better…”

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72 See Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, sections 14(2) and 14(7)
73 ISC Report, Recommendation B.
74 ISC Report, Recommendation F.
63. To the extent that these problems are attributable to a lack of resources, Liberty welcomes the Government’s commitment to allocate an additional £130 million to the Agencies over the next two years. However, there appears to be a more fundamental concern, namely that “MI5 does not currently have a strategy for dealing with Subjects of Interest who appear on the periphery of several investigations.” Liberty welcomes the ISC’s recommendation that the ‘cumulative effect’ of various connections and activities be taken into account and appropriate attention be paid to the interactions between subjects of interest.

(ii) Record keeping and co-ordination between the Agencies and the police

64. The ISC Report identified significant problems with processes around record keeping and the sharing of information between police and the Agencies. The Committee recommended, in particular, that when MI5 requests information from police on a suspect, police must ensure they share all information that is held. Improving internal procedures and ensuring effective communication between police and the Agencies offers the prospect of advancing investigations towards eventual prosecution. In the words of the ISC:

“The Committee considers there is insufficient co-ordination between MI5 and police investigations. Disruption based on criminal activities offers a potential opportunity to reduce the threat posed by extremists. MI5 and the police must improve both the process and the level of communication.”

(iii) Delays

65. Criticisms are made at several points in the Report about substantial delays in opening and progressing investigations. Specifically, the ISC noted “the four month delay in opening an investigation into Adebolajo following his return from Kenya”; “The eight months it took for MI5 to start investigating Adebowale (three months to identify him followed by five months of inaction” “the length of time Adebowale’s Leads waited in MI5’s ‘Leads Processing Queue’ – far greater that either the expected time or the average time” “the delays in submitting the application to use further intrusive techniques in Adebowale’s

75 ISC Report, Recommendation O.
76 ISC Report, Recommendation G.
77 ISC Report, Recommendation T.
78 ISC Report, Recommendation N.
79 ISC Report, Recommendation I.
80 ISC Report, Recommendation S.
81 ISC Report, Recommendation CC.
In the case of this last failure, the ISC noted that Adebowale would probably have been subject to close surveillance in the days before Fusilier Lee Rigby’s murder had the application “not taken nearly twice as long as it should have”.  

66. There is clearly an institutional problem with delay which must be addressed. Liberty welcomes the ISC’s recommendation that deadlines be introduced for the handling of low-priority cases, that Leads be automatically escalated if not handled within a prescribed time, and that those believed to have joined a terrorist groups overseas be investigated immediately and as a matter of urgency on their return to the UK.

(iv) “Self-starting” terrorists

67. The Committee noted a failure on the part of the Agencies to respond to the new and evolving threat posed by “self-starting” terrorists. Whilst less sophisticated, individual-led plots will inevitably be harder to detect than conspiracies involving multiple parties and with connections to high profile figures, the Committee recommended that “MI5 must ensure its prioritisation framework is sufficiently flexible to deal with the threat from individuals as well as networks”. In this respect Liberty further welcomes the allocation of additional resources, which the Prime Minister has made clear could be used to further develop investigations into suspected self-starting terrorists.

Intercept in criminal proceedings

68. There is an urgent need to lift the bar on the admissibility of intercept evidence in criminal proceedings. Introducing prior judicial warranty for interception of communications to prevent abuse, and then removing the ban enshrined in section 17(1) RIPA would allow the security agencies and law enforcement to better use the surveillance information they generate to prosecute, convict and imprison those planning terror attacks. The bar is an anomaly and persist despite the fact that criminal prosecutions can rely on use of informers, product from bugging devices, foreign intercept. Pre-Snowden, GCHQ internally resisted efforts to make intercept product admissible on the basis that such a move would reveal the

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82 ISC Report, Recommendation KK.
83 ISC Report, Recommendation KK.
84 ISC Report, Recommendation S.
85 ISC Report, Recommendation CC.
86 ISC Report, Recommendation I.
87 ISC Report, Recommendation AA.
scale of its interception programmes and lead to a ‘damaging public debate’. Whistleblowing disclosures have now brought about the damaging public debate anyway. The Chilcot Review, the Home Affairs Select Committee, the Joint Committee on Human Rights, three former Directors of Public Prosecutions, a former Attorney General and the former director of MI5, Dame Stella Rimington, have reached the conclusion that intercept can and should be used. In the face of this diverse and unlikely coalition of supporters for a change in law, the Government’s continued inaction on intercept evidence is untenable.

Introducing police bail – properly circumscribed – for terror offences

69. Many of the ineffective policy contortions of recent years, from control orders, through TPIMs, to current passport seizure powers appear to spring from an inability to impose pre-charge conditions on terror suspects as part of a criminal investigation. Liberty believes that the time has come to replace civil anti-terror orders and exceptional passport seizure powers with a properly circumscribed system of police bail. Under police bail, conditions could be imposed on terror suspects in cases where there is insufficient evidence to charge. Curfews, requirements not to go to certain places or meet certain people are common conditions of police bail, permitted for all non-terror offences including serious offences such as murder and rape. A system of police bail conditions for terror offences could replicate many existing police bail conditions as well as some of the restrictions which currently feature in the TPIMs regime.

70. It is not necessarily objectionable, from a civil liberties perspective, to restrict the movements and activities of those who have not been charged. This is done by the police every day in the UK when they arrest and then release suspects on police bail, however police bail is currently prohibited in terrorism cases. The major problem with police bail as it stands is the lack of a statutory time limit – Liberty has recommended a six month limit in this regard. Subject to this caveat, a system of police bail is preferable to parallel systems of civil orders and ad-hoc powers for a number of important reasons. First it means restrictions are only imposed when police suspicion has reached the necessary threshold to justify arrest on suspicion of a criminal offence, restoring a vital constitutional protection for suspects. Second it would ensure that police and security services are working effectively

89 Section 3A of the Bail Act 1976 allows for bail to be granted by a custody officer under Part 4 of the Police And Criminal Evidence (PACE) Act 1984; section 41 and Schedule 8 of the Terrorism Act 2000, provisions under which terrorist suspects are arrested and detained, do not fall within the detention provisions under Part 4 of the PACE Act and therefore police bail cannot be granted under section 3A of the Bail Act for individuals who have been detained under section 41.

90 Liberty’s Response to the College of Policing Consultation on Pre-charge Bail, June 2014.
together. to surveil, investigate and gather evidence rather than impeding criminal investigations. Finally, the vast sums of public money required to implement and defend the control order and TPIM regimes in the courts could be re-directed for more comprehensive surveillance of those suspected of involvement in terrorism.

Judge-led inquiry into allegations of UK complicity in rendition and torture

71. The Coalition repeatedly pledged to set up a judicial inquiry into allegations of UK complicity in torture and rendition. It has now handed the task to the Intelligence & Security Committee which in 2007 mistakenly cleared the Agencies of wrongdoing. Victims of rendition and torture understandably do not trust the Committee to investigate the claims. We urgently need an inquiry compliant with international and domestic human rights standards to get to the truth of these allegations and comply with fundamental human rights standards on the prohibition of torture, including the provision of effective redress. The limitations inherent in the ISC’s mandate and powers, the fact that members are appointed by the Prime Minister and reports are subject to Government redaction are just some of the reasons why the current investigation does not come close to satisfying the obligation to conduct an independent, effective, thorough and impartial investigation into the serious human rights violations. Evidence slowly coming to light concerning MI6 involvement in Michael Adebolajo’s detention in Kenya makes a judicial inquiry more pressing than ever — current practice appears to fall short of our international obligations and the Agencies are finding new ways to side-step their obligations.

72. Meanwhile Government continues to fight successive torture and rendition actions on the basis that hearing the case would damage the special relationship the UK has with the USA. In recent months this argument has been rejected twice in the higher courts and at least two claims are now set to proceed. On 30th October 2014 the Court of Appeal ruled that the claim of former Libyan dissident Abdul Hakim Belhadj and his then pregnant wife, Fatima Bouchar, alleging that former Foreign Secretary Jack Straw and MI6 were complicit, along with the CIA, in his rendition from Hong Kong to Libya in 2004 should proceed. The Court noted that the claim concerned “particularly grave violations of human rights” and that there was a “compelling public interest in the investigation by the English courts of these very grave allegations”.

Yunus Rahmatullah, a Pakistani national captured by British Forces in February 2004 and detained without charge or trial for 10 years during which period he claims he was tortured by both British and American troops, has also been told

91 Belhaj [2014] EWCA Civ 1394, paragraph 117.
that his claim can proceed. Mr Justice Leggatt ruled that should the Court refuse to hear the case as the Government insisted it would be “an abdication of its constitutional function.”

73. Until the issue of this country’s involvement in rendition and torture is properly examined, it will continue to stain our reputation and alienate communities whose co-operation is much needed at this critical time. As Conservative MP, Andrew Tyrie, observed earlier this week:

“It is in the British national interest and in the interest of the security services, as well as of those who may have been maltreated, that we uncover the truth sooner rather than later. Only then can we draw a line under these allegations and rebuild trust.”

Support for human rights teaching in schools

74. With their remit to guide and support children through important stages of their intellectual and personal development, teachers are uniquely well placed to reduce the risk of children and vulnerable adults being drawn towards violent extremism by encouraging open debate on sensitive political issues and teaching students about democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Such a vital role can only be performed effectively if students trust their teachers and feel able to speak freely about deeply personal issues of morality and if teachers feel equipped and supported to teach such subjects. Liberty believes that this is not currently the case meaning that children do not gain knowledge of concepts that are vital in rejecting the extremist ideology. While recent Department of Education guidance has clumsily instructed teachers to “promote British values" the Government has sent hugely mixed messages about the teaching of human rights in schools and does little to support its teaching. The 2007 national curriculum on Citizenship expressly provided that teaching must address “issues relating to social justice, human rights, community cohesion and global interdependence” and encourage “students to challenge injustice, inequalities and discrimination“. In 2013 the Department of Education consulted on removing reference to human rights altogether. Liberty objected and thankfully the Department reconsidered, but the curriculum was narrowed to teaching on “the precious liberties enjoyed by the citizens of the United Kingdom“ and separately “human rights and international law“. For its part the Welsh Government has removed human rights from the Welsh Baccalaureate curriculum for post-16 level 1 and 2 students. Against this backdrop it is little wonder that teachers report feeling reluctant to teach human rights, a situation reportedly exacerbated by the negative
media and political portrayals of human rights. An obvious area for better Executive leadership in countering the extremist narrative would be to support schools in the teaching of human rights.

Conclusion

75. When the Coalition first came to power it bound itself together with the language of civil liberties. With this Bill the Government abrogates its fledging commitment to ensure we do not abandon our values in the fight against terror. In confronting an ugly ideology that promotes arbitrary violence, the subjugation of women and tyranny, we would expect political leaders to robustly and actively promote democratic values such as the rule of law, human rights and equal treatment. Instead, the Bill plays into the hands of terrorists by allowing them to shape our laws in a way that undermines our principles. Exclusion orders, flight bans and passport seizures will do nothing to neutralise an organised terror threat which does not respect international borders. Ad-hoc police powers and ever more restrictive systems of civil orders will only deflect attention from arrests and prosecutions. Embroiling our teachers in terror-policing will alienate and marginalise, whilst more powers to monitor the nation’s online communication turn us into a nation of suspects. The Agencies by their nature will always ask for more powers, concerned as they are with a short term preventative agenda, not well-suited to the vital longer term goal of preventing radicalisation and prosecuting and convicting terrorists. It is the job of Government and Parliamentarians, charged with the long-term protection of national security, to interrogate their approach and tightly circumscribe the powers available. The ISC has offered multiple suggestions for reform of the agencies which are ignored in this Bill, as are measures aimed at facilitating prosecutions through the extension of police bail and the removal of the bar on intercept in criminal proceedings.

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