Liberty’s Committee Stage Evidence on the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

June 2018
About Liberty

Liberty (The National Council for Civil Liberties) is one of the UK’s leading civil liberties and human rights organisations. Liberty works to promote human rights and protect civil liberties through a combination of test case litigation, lobbying, campaigning and research.

Liberty Policy

Liberty provides policy responses to Government consultations on all issues which have implications for human rights and civil liberties. We also submit evidence to Select Committees, Inquiries and other policy fora, and undertake independent, funded research.


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Liberty welcomes the opportunity to submit written evidence to the Public Bill Committee on the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill. The Bill poses several significant threats to civil liberties and human rights, symptomatic of a poorly conceived strategy that mistakes blind expansion of government power for evidence-driven responses to national security concerns. Our core concerns, each addressed in this briefing are:

- The criminalisation of expression or inquiry divorced from any act in pursuit of actual terrorism.
- The impact of new charging measures on protest.
- A weakening of protections around the retention of biometric data.
- An extension of Prevent together with a failure to reflect on long-standing concerns about the strategy.
- A radical expansion of intrusive, suspicionless border powers in the face of long-standing concerns about existing powers set out at Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (the 2000 Act).

Criminalising expression and inquiry

Recklessly expressing support for a proscribed organisation

Amendment

Page 1, line 5, leave out Clause 1

Effect

This amendment would remove clause 1 from the Bill. Clause 1 extends the existing offence of “inviting support for a proscribed organisation” beyond knowingly inviting support to expressions of support and being “reckless” as to whether they will encourage support for a proscribed group.\(^1\)

Briefing

The existing “invitation of support” offence is already dangerously broad. In the 2016 case of *R v Choudhary and Rahman*, the Court of Appeal held that a person need not be personally providing support for a banned organisation, rather: “the criminality…lies in inviting support

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\(^1\) Amends section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000.
The support need not be tangible or practical, but could include approval, endorsement or other "intellectual" support.³

The Government is now seeking to erode the very element of the offence of invitation which allowed the Court in Choudary to conclude that it was compatible with the right to freedom of speech:

When considering the proportionality of the interference, it is important to emphasise that the section only prohibits inviting support for a proscribed organisation with the requisite intent. It does not prohibit the expression of views or opinions, no matter how offensive, but only the knowing invitation of support from others for the proscribed organisation. To the extent that section 12(1)(a) thereby interferes with the rights protected under article 10 of the Convention, we consider that interference to be fully justified.⁴

In addition to extending the criminal law to cover mere expression, the Bill lowers the threshold for criminality by specifying that those who express support being “reckless” as to the question of whether another will be encouraged have committed an offence. Such a person faces a maximum prison sentence of 10 years.⁵ While recklessness is a common legal test in some areas of the criminal law, including offences against the person, it is not an appropriate standard for criminalisation when applied to speech. As the Joint Committee on Human Rights concluded in 2006:

…recklessness is normally applied to actions that are themselves within the realm of criminality… if you hit someone or deceive them then it is absolutely appropriate for a jury to be able to convict you of an offence even if you did not intend the consequences of your actions. The same nexus between action and consequence should not exist for speech offences. Speech does not naturally reside in the realm of criminality. This is why the element of intention should always be attached to speech offences. It is the means by which proper criminal responsibility can be determined.⁶

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² R v Choudhary and Rahman [2016] EWCA Crim 61, paragraph 45.
³ Choudhary and Rahman, paragraph 46.
⁴ Choudhary and Rahman, paragraph 70.
⁵ Terrorism Act 2000, Section 12.
Preparing for acts of terrorism is already a criminal offence punishable by life in prison.\(^7\) Encouragement of terrorism is also already criminal and under the provisions of this Bill, would attract a maximum sentence of 15 years imprisonment.\(^8\) There are also a broad range of offences which relate to practical support for – and encouragement of - a proscribed organisation, including: directing its activities;\(^9\) membership or professing membership;\(^10\) wearing its uniform or displaying its insignia;\(^11\) arranging a meeting to support a proscribed group;\(^12\) addressing such a meeting;\(^13\) fundraising for the organisation or in other ways providing financial or practical support;\(^14\) or – in some circumstances - to fail to disclose a suspicion or belief that somebody else has provided such support.\(^15\) The criminal law already provides the tools to deal with those who provide support for terrorism or banned groups. The Government have not made the case for the extension of the criminal law into the realm of bare expression which does not and is not intended to further the cause of terrorists.

**Publication of images**

**Amendment**

Page 1, line 13, leave out Clause 2

**Effect**

This amendment would remove clause 2 form the Bill. Clause 2 creates a new offence of publishing an image of an item of clothing or an article in circumstances arousing suspicion that a person is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation.

**Briefing**

It is already a criminal offence to wear clothing or display an article likely to arouse suspicion of membership of a proscribed group.\(^16\) Liberty does not support the existing law’s criminalisation of a costume or insignia. The Government has made explicit its intention that

\(^7\) Terrorism Act 2006, section 5.
\(^8\) Terrorism Act 2006, section 1.
\(^9\) Terrorism Act 2000, Section 56
\(^10\) Terrorism Act 2000, Section 12.
\(^12\) Terrorism Act 2000, Section 12.
\(^13\) Terrorism Act 2000, Section 12.
\(^14\) Terrorism Act 2000, Section 15-18
\(^15\) Terrorism Act 2000, Section 19.
\(^16\) Terrorism Act 2000, section 13.
this new offence should cover photographs taken in a private place, deepening the risk that this offence becomes a means for the state to judge behaviour which does not and was not intended to incite criminality.\textsuperscript{17} Clause 2 increases the risk that law enforcement officials attempting to interpret the meaning of a photograph will mistake reference for endorsement, irony for sincerity, and childish misdirection for genuine threat.

The publication element of this new offence further risks having a chilling effect on journalists, archivists or researchers who may publish images, whether historic or contemporary, of the insignia of banned groups. The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation has expressed concerns about this offence and in particular “what clause 2 unamended says about those who seek to display in private historical images of individuals working for organisations that were proscribed decades ago where it is a matter of historical record and nothing more.”\textsuperscript{18}

The new offence does not require an affected individual to in fact be a member of a proscribed organisation, to support it whether tangibly or intellectually or to intend to encourage others to support a proscribed group by publishing an image. The only requirement is that the circumstances of a publication “arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation”.\textsuperscript{19} Uncertainty as to what characteristics of an academic or circumstances of publication might lead to a suspicion of support for a banned group could well have a chilling effect on those simply seeking to document events.

The behaviour of those who disseminate terrorist publications intending to encourage or being reckless as to whether his behaviour encourages terrorism is already criminalised by section 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006 and will attract a 15 year maximum sentence under the provisions of this Bill.\textsuperscript{20} This extension of the law risks criminalising those who have no intention to do or encourage others to do harm.

\textbf{Viewing material over the internet}

\textit{Amendment}

\begin{quote}
Page 2, line 7, leave out Clause 3
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{17} Explanatory Notes, paragraph 33.
\textsuperscript{18} Public Bill Committee, 26\textsuperscript{th} June 2018, Q.88.
\textsuperscript{19} Proposed new clause 13(1A) of the Terrorism Act 2000.
\textsuperscript{20} Clause 6(6).
Effect

This amendment would remove clause 3 from the Bill. Clause 3 amends the existing offence of “collecting information” to include viewing online content “of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism” three or more times. The content viewed may be different on each occasion.

Briefing

It is already a criminal offence to download information which could be useful for terrorism.\(^{21}\) The Government’s intention is that the offence will cover situations where the defendant is in control of a computer, but also situations where an individual “was viewing the material, for example, over the controller’s shoulder”.\(^ {22}\)

The Government suggests that the “three clicks” requirement” is designed to prevent prosecutions of those who accidentally alight on online content, but it would be criminal to click on 3 different articles or videos of a kind likely to be of use to a terrorist, even if they relate to entirely different and unrelated groups and the clicks occur years apart. As the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation warned the Public Bill Committee, clause 1: “is very likely to attract arguments of principle based on a rights analysis, principally article 10 on the freedom of expression”.\(^ {23}\) He went on to express the view that the government should refrain from legislating in the way proposed at clause 3, particularly in light of the other offences already available to law enforcement.\(^ {24}\)

The offence at clause 3 risks criminalising academic inquiry, journalistic investigation or passive curiosity without any intention to harm. As the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation has pointed out, it also risks criminalising “those who view material in disgust, shock and disapproval.”\(^ {25}\)

While a defence of reasonable excuse is available, the courts have been clear that reasonable excuse is “a concept for decision by the jury on the individual facts of each case”.\(^ {26}\) It would be open to an individual to submit “for the jury’s consideration his assertion that that purpose was an objectively reasonable one.”\(^ {27}\) The courts have explicitly declined to

\(^{21}\) Terrorism Act 2000, section 58.
\(^{22}\) Explanatory Notes, paragraph 37.
\(^{23}\) Commons Public Bill Committee, 26th June 2018, Q84.
\(^{24}\) Commons Public Bill Committee, 26th June 2018, Q86.
give more guidance than this, leaving the test an inherently uncertain one to be determined on the facts of an individual case. When the stakes are as high as 15 years in prison, it is the brave journalist or researcher who will be undeterred. The chilling effect of this offence on free speech will be significant.

Protest

Amendment

Clause 14, page 15, line 20, at end insert –

(2A) The authority may not impose any charge where the relevant event is a public procession or assembly as defined by section 16 of the Public Order Act 1986 taking place for the purposes set out at section 11(1) of the same Act.

Effect

This amendment would ensure that a new power to impose charges in connection with anti-terror measures at events or particular sites does not restrict protest rights through the imposition of costs that organisers are unable to pay.

Briefing

Clause 14 of the Bill provides that where an order or notice is made by an authority under new section 22C of the Road Traffic Act 1984, in relation to measures to reduce the likelihood of danger connected with terrorism, that authority may now impose “a charge of such amount as it thinks reasonable in respect of anything done in connection with or in consequence of the order or notice (or proposed order or notice)”.

The charge is payable by an event promoter or organiser, or occupier of a site, and relevant events include those events taking place for charitable or not for profit purposes.

Liberty is concerned that this power to impose a charge could be levied against the organisers of static or moving protests or other demonstrations. An exemption should be set out to expressly exclude public processions and assemblies taking place to demonstrate support for or opposition to the views or actions of any person or body of persons, to

28Counter-terrorism and Border Security Bill 2018, Part 1, Chapter 3, clause 14(2)
publicise a cause or campaign, or to mark or commemorate an event," from these charges. This amendment is designed to ensure the right of freedom of assembly and association as protected by Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) are not curtailed by a demonstration organiser’s inability to pay any charge levied under this clause.

**Biometric data**

**Oversight of the Biometrics Commissioner**

**Amendment**

Schedule 2, page 26, line 5, leave out paragraph 2.

**Effect**

Section 63G of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 currently requires the Biometrics Commissioner to consent to the retention of biometric material where the qualifying offence is a terrorism offence listed in section 41(1) of the Terrorism Act 2008 (or a related ancillary offence, such as attempting or conspiring to commit the offence).

Schedule 2, paragraph 2 of the Bill provides that such material may now be retained for five years without the consent of the Biometrics Commissioner.

This amendment would remove this paragraph, such that the oversight of the Biometrics Commissioner is retained.

**Briefing**

The Explanatory Notes accompanying the Bill record that this change was intended to bring the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 in line with the equivalent provisions under paragraph 20B of Schedule 8 to the 2000 Act, which does not allow for the oversight of the Biometrics Commissioner as detailed above. Liberty opposes the removal of the oversight of the Biometrics Commissioner, especially in a context where the fingerprints and DNA profile of a person arrested for, but not charged with, a terrorism offence or a terrorism-related offence are being retained.

29 Public Order Act 1986, Section 11(1)
The principles to which the Biometrics Commissioner makes reference when making his determination are outlined in the document “Principles for Assessing Applications for Biometric Retention”\(^{30}\). These include the nature, circumstances and seriousness of the alleged offence, the grounds for suspicion, the reasons why the arrestee has not been charged, the strength of any reasons for believing that retention may assist in the prevention or detection of crime, the nature and seriousness of the crime or crimes which that retention may assist in preventing or detecting; and the age and other characteristics of the arrestee and any representations by the arrestee as regards those or any other matters.

The Commissioner will grant such an application – and will consider the extended retention of such material “appropriate” – only if they are persuaded that in the circumstances of the particular case which gives rise to that application that:

- There are compelling reasons to believe that the retention of the material at issue may assist in the prevention or detection of crime and would be proportionate; and
- The reasons for so believing are more compelling than those which could be put forward in respect of most individuals without previous convictions who are arrested for, but not charged with, a “qualifying” offence.

Whilst Liberty does not support the retention of biometric data for those who have committed no crime in any event, the removal of this protection is alarming and Liberty is concerned that retention will no longer be dependent on a full and detailed consideration, by the Biometrics Commissioner, of the factors outlined above.

**Retention periods**

**Amendment**

| Schedule 2, page 26, line 29, leave out sub-paragraph 3(4) |

**Effect**

Sub-paragraph 3(4) extends the time period for which invasive biometric data, including fingerprints and DNA, can be retained – including biometric data of people who have never been convicted of any crime – from two years to five years.

The removal of this paragraph means that the time period will remain at two years.

*Amendment*

Schedule 2, page 29, line 3, leave out sub-paragraph 7(4).

*Effect*

Sub-paragraph 7(4) extends the time period for which invasive biometric data, including fingerprints and DNA, can be retained – including biometric data of people who have never been convicted of any crime – from two years to five years.

The removal of this paragraph means that the time period will remain at two years.

*Amendment*

Schedule 2, page 30, line 3, leave out sub-paragraph 10(4).

*Effect*

Sub-paragraph 10(4) extends the time period for which invasive biometric data, including fingerprints and DNA, can be retained – including biometric data of people who have never been convicted of any crime – from two years to five years.

The removal of this paragraph means that the time period will remain at two years.

*Amendment*

Schedule 2, page 31, line 32, leave out sub-paragraph 13(4).

*Effect*

This paragraph extends the time period for which invasive biometric data, including fingerprints and DNA, can be retained – including biometric data of people who have never been convicted of any crime – from two years to five years.
The removal of this paragraph means that the time period will remain at two years.

Amendment

Schedule 2, page 33, line 4, leave out sub-paragraph 16(4).

Effect

This paragraph extends the time period for which invasive biometric data, including fingerprints and DNA, can be retained – including biometric data of people who have never been convicted of any crime – from two years to five years.

The removal of this paragraph means that the time period will remain at two years.

Amendment

Schedule 2, page 34, line 28, leave out paragraph 19.

Effect

This paragraph extends the time period for which invasive biometric data, including fingerprints and DNA, can be retained – including biometric data of people who have never been convicted of any crime – from two years to five years.

The removal of this paragraph means that the time period will remain at two years.

Briefing

Liberty has grave concerns about the extent to which the Bill allows the retention of biometric data on anyone arrested, including DNA and fingerprints – even if they were unlawfully or mistakenly arrested.
There are already abuses of the retention of information in relation to the National Police Database,\(^{31}\) and there is ongoing and unresolved controversy over the Government’s abject failure to comply with court declarations that existing police databases of custody images violate human rights laws.\(^{32}\) Liberty opposes retaining the biometric data of people unlawfully or mistakenly arrested, as well as any expansion of biometric databases in light of its well-documented and heavily criticised failure to correct these egregious errors and human rights violations in the Police National Database of custody images.

Biometric data – physical, physiological and behavioural characteristics which allow for the unique identification of that person – is deeply private information. When the state seeks to take, retain and use such material, the individual’s right to privacy is engaged. There must be a legitimate aim for the intrusion, and it must not occur if the legitimate aim could be achieved in a way which either does not intrude into a person's privacy or could do so to a lesser degree.

Liberty is not aware of any evidence that supports the suggestion that the detection of crime is improved by retaining biometric data of people who are arrested but not charged, or people against whom charges are dropped or who are found to be innocent compared to, say retaining the biometric data of random members of the public. This point was forcefully made by Richard Atkinson, the Chair of the Law Society’s Criminal Law Committee:

> Before one could be satisfied of the need to extend periods of retention of biometric data, there would need to be a case made out. I certainly have not seen it… great caution needs to be expressed before extending the periods of the retention of that data without an evidential base.\(^{33}\)

There can further be no justification for a person unlawfully or mistakenly arrested to have their biometric data exceptionally stored rather than destroyed.

The collection of such data has wider privacy implications exacerbated by its connection with other sources of information and Government databases (for example, the Police National Computer, which sees connections drawn between sets of personal data and made available to a wider range of police bodies).


\(^{33}\) Public Bill Committee, 26\(^{th}\) June 2018, Q76.
Finally, the retention of innocent people’s DNA has a disproportionate impact on people from BAME backgrounds. Estimates vary, but it has been projected that between a half and three-quarters of young black men have had their DNA stored on the DNA Database. This is because of the higher number of arrests of black people per head of population (which is not reflected in a correspondingly higher number of convictions).

Prevent

Independent review

Amendment

Page 19, line 3, insert the following new Clause –

(i) Independent Review of Prevent

(1) Before the end of the period of three months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State shall appoint an independent reviewer to:
   (a) conduct an independent review of the operation of the Prevent strategy; and
   (b) send a report to the Secretary of State on the findings of the review.

(2) The report must address the following matters:
   (a) the extension of Prevent to encompass non-violent extremism;
   (b) the interaction of Prevent with:
      (i) other legal duties on public authorities; and
      (ii) the criminal law.
   (c) the manner in which personal information is processed and shared by authorities involved in the Prevent strategy and Channel programme;
   (d) the human rights implications of Prevent; and
   (e) the adequacy of current oversight and disclosure arrangements.

(3) The independent reviewer must invite evidence from civil society groups and others with expertise in, or experience of, Prevent.

(4) An individual must not be appointed to the role of independent reviewer if that individual—
   (a) has a close association with Her Majesty's Government; or
   (b) has concurrent obligations as a Government appointed reviewer or adviser.

(5) The reviewer must have access to security sensitive information on the same basis as the reviewer appointed under section 36 of the Terrorism Act 2006.
(6) The Secretary of State shall provide the reviewer with such staff as are sufficient to secure that the reviewer is able to properly carry out his functions.

(7) The Secretary of State must pay to the reviewer-
(a) expenses incurred in carrying out its functions under this section, and
(b) such allowances as the Secretary of State determines.

(8) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a copy of the report received under subsection 1(b).

(9) In this section "Prevent" means the Prevent strand of the Government’s counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST together with the provisions set out at Part 5 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015.

Effect

This amendment would require the Home Secretary to appoint an independent person to review the operation of the Prevent strategy. The reviewer would be required to consider a non-exhaustive list of aspects of the Prevent regime. The considerations listed at (2)(a)-(e) represent areas of particular concern in relation to the operation Prevent, including the strategy’s focus on non-violent extremism and problems with oversight and transparency highlighted by the former Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson QC.\textsuperscript{34} In the wake of Government programmes facilitating greater information sharing between law enforcement and local authorities under Prevent, this amendment would require the Independent Reviewer to consider the handling and sharing of information by public authorities involved in the operation of Prevent.

To qualify for the role of independent reviewer, the amendment requires that an individual be independent of government. It also requires that they do not already have a function as a government appointed reviewer or advisor. The Prevent reviewer would be required to invite submissions from those with expertise and experience of Prevent and would be able to consider security sensitive information on the same basis as the current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation.

Briefing

The Prevent strategy seeks to pre-empt terrorist attacks by identifying those at risk of becoming terrorists. The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 now enlists public sector

\textsuperscript{34} David Anderson QC, Prevent strategy can work against radicalisation… if it is trusted, The Evening Standard, 13\textsuperscript{th} February 2017.
workers to carry out the government’s work, including requiring teachers from the child care sector up to university level to identify apparent signs of extremism in their students.

Concerns about the impact and operation of Prevent have been raised by a number of individuals, organisations and bodies, including by the former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, the Home Affairs Select Committee, the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the Women and Equalities Committee, the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, the UN Special Rapporteur on counter terrorism and human rights, a host of academics, the National Union of Teachers, the National Union of Students and Muslim community groups. Concerns have also been raised in the House of Lords, by Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat Members of Parliament and, by the Green Party.

Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights and others have echoed the call for a full, transparent and independent review of the Prevent strategy. The former Reviewer of

35 http://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/david-anderson-qc-prevent-strategy-can-work-against-radicalisation-if-it-is-trusted-a3467901.html
36 https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/135/135.pdf
Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson QC, while supporting the Prevent strategy in principle, has noted that an independent review would be: "peculiarly appropriate for an area in which potential conflicts between state power and civil liberties are acute, but information is tightly rationed". This Bill provides the opportunity to give this controversial programme the scrutiny it urgently requires.

The Government's recent internal review of its CONTEST strategy, including the Prevent element, fails to look critically at widespread concerns about Prevent and simply reasserts the value of the programme. This internal review fails, in particular, to reflect on the strategy's focus on non-violent extremism, the interaction of Prevent with the criminal law and other legal duties on public authorities, and problems with oversight and transparency highlighted by the former Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson QC.

**Transparency**

**Amendment**

Page 19, line 3, insert the following new clause –

( ) Transparency requirements relating to Prevent

(1) Section 36 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 is amended as follows.
(2) After subsection (3) insert -

(3A) The Secretary of State must ensure the collection and annual release of statistics on:

(a) the religion; and

(b) the ethnicity

of those subject to a referral under subsection (3).

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52 David Anderson QC, ‘Prevent strategy can work against radicalisation… if it is trusted,’ Evening Standard (16 February 2017), available at: http://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/david-anderson-qc-prevent-strategy-can-work-against-radicalisation-if-it-is-trusted-a3467901.html
53 David Anderson QC, Prevent strategy can work against radicalisation… if it is trusted, The Evening Standard, 13th February 2017.
**Effect**

This amendment would require the Home Office to collect and publish annually the data necessary to establish whether Prevent is disproportionately impacting those of certain ethnicities and faiths.

**Briefing**

Whilst the Government publishes data on the age, gender and region of residence of those referred under the Prevent programme together with the type of concern raised, it fails to produce information which would allow for an assessment of the impact of the programme on those of certain ethnicities and faiths. If the Government is genuinely committed to increasing transparency around Prevent, it must include these figures in its statistical releases.

**Local authority referral power**

**Amendment**

Page 19, line 3, leave out Clause 18.

**Effect**

This amendment would remove clause 18 from the Bill. Clause 18 extends the Prevent strategy by allowing local authorities, as well as police, to refer individuals to Channel panels.

**Briefing**

Clause 18 is part of a broader Government commitment, heralded in its new CONTEST strategy, to drive counter-terror operations further into our communities. This new referral power will be used in conjunction with ill-conceived information-sharing arrangements between the security services and local service providers.54 Rather than expanding Prevent and embroiling more service providers and local officials, this Bill should be used as an opportunity to require a full and independent review of the strategy.

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Suspicionsless port and border control powers

Schedule 3 of the Bill introduces a new regime of suspicionsless border control powers, which broadly mirror powers set out at Schedule 7 of the 2000 Act, but are based on an astonishingly broad definition of “hostile activity”.

Schedule 7 of the 2000 Act – reasonable suspicion

Amendment

Page 18, line 8, insert the following new Clause –

( ) Threshold for port and border control powers
(1) Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph 1 after subsection (3) insert -
   “(3A) A person may only be questioned under section 2 or 3 where the examining
   officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that he is a person falling within section
   40(1)(b)”.
(3) In paragraph 2 omit subsection (4).
(4) In paragraph 6 at end insert -
   “(3A) An examining officer may only stop or detain a person under this section where
   he has reasonable grounds to suspect that he is a person falling within section
   40(1)(b)”.

Effect

This amendment would introduce a threshold of reasonable suspicion for exercise of the intrusive Schedule 7 powers to stop, question, search, compel the production of documents, detain individuals, gain access to electronic devices and copy and confiscate belongings. To meet the threshold for exercising Schedule 7 powers, an examining officer must have reasonable grounds for suspecting that an individual is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism.55

55 Terrorism Act 2000, Section 40(1)(b).
Threshold for port and border control powers

(1) Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 is amended as follows.

(2) In paragraph 5 before “A person who is questioned” insert “Subject to paragraph 9A”.

(3) After paragraph 6A(2) insert -

“(2A) A person questioned under paragraph 2 or 3 may not be detained under paragraph 6 unless the examining officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that he is a person falling within section 40(1)(b).”

(4) In paragraph 8(1) before “An examining officer” insert “Subject to paragraph 9A below,”

(5) In paragraph 9(1) before “An examining officer” insert “Subject to paragraph 9A below,”

(6) After paragraph 9 insert -

“9A Data stored on electronic devices

(1) For the purposes of this Schedule -

(a) the information or documents which a person can be required to give the examining officer under paragraph 5,

(b) the things which may be searched under paragraph 8, and

(c) the property which may be examined under paragraph 9

do not include data stored on personal electronic devices unless the person is detained under paragraph 6.

(2) “Personal electronic device” includes a mobile phone, a personal computer and any other portable electronic device on which personal information is stored.

Effect

This amendment would implement the recommendations of Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights and introduce a reasonable suspicion threshold before an individual can be subject to the most intrusive powers under Schedule 7. The amendment would require an officer to have reasonable grounds for suspecting an individual is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism before she could detain an individual for up to 6 hours under Schedule 7.\(^{56}\) The amendment also creates a threshold of reasonable suspicion before an officer can detain an individual or access, search and

\(^{56}\) Terrorism Act 2000, Section 40(1)(b).
examine data stored on personal electronic devices. The amendment achieves this by restricting such access and examinations to situations where a person is detained under a suspicion-based power.

**Briefing**

Liberty, alongside many parliamentarians and civil society groups, has long objected to existing suspicionless port and border control powers provided for at Schedule 7 of the 2000 Act. Schedule 7 disproportionately impacts those of Asian ethnicity and is unduly invasive of privacy, dangerous to journalistic and legal privilege, and a violation of due process. Clause 15 of the Bill already amends Schedule 7 to clarify that answers given when questioned under Schedule 7 cannot generally be used in evidence in criminal proceedings against the individual questioned. This Bill provides the opportunity to further amendment Schedule 7.

The latest report of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation confirms that while the number of examinations under Schedule 7 has fallen, “the number of Asians examined under Schedule 7 is disproportionately high when compared to white persons and when expressed as a proportion of persons sharing the same ethnicity”.\(^57\) Elsewhere suspicionless powers to stop and search also disproportionately affect those of certain ethnicities. Under suspicion-based search powers you are eight times more likely to be stopped and searched by police if you are black than if you are white,\(^58\) but that disparity deepens when it comes to the power to stop and search without suspicion. Black people are 14 times more likely to face a search under the suspicionless power set out at section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act than white people.\(^59\)

The sort of intrusive powers available under Schedule 7 of the 2000 Act – including powers to question, search, seize and retain documents, access data stored on electronic devices and detain individuals for up to 6 hours - should only be available where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that an individual is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism. This would provide a safeguard against the discriminatory use of Schedule 7 on the basis of ethnicity or faith.

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\(^{57}\) Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, THE TERRORISM ACTS IN 2016, paragraph 5.12.

\(^{58}\) Section 1 of PACE.

Suspicionless powers to stop, search, seize, retain and detain under Schedule 3

Amendment

Page 19, line 30, leave out clause 20 and Schedule 3.

Effect

This amendment would remove clause 20 and Schedule 3 from the Bill. Together these provisions provide for a new regime of intrusive suspicionless powers at the border. Schedule 3 broadly mirrors the provisions set at Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000.

Briefing

The powers set out at Schedule 3 of the Bill largely mirror those granted by Schedule 7. Where an individual is stopped under Schedule 3, she must provide any information or document that the officer requests. Failure to provide requested documents or information is a criminal offence, carrying a penalty of up to three months' imprisonment and a fine of £2500. A person can be body-searched and have any personal effects searched, seized and copied. Property belonging to a person—such as a mobile phone, laptop, family photographs, or important work papers—can be seized and retained for a wide range of reasons for no clearly defined period of time.

If an officer wants to stop or question a person for more than an hour, they must formally detain them. Once a person is detained, they must be released no later than six hours from when questioning first began, unless they are detained under another power. However, nothing prevents a border agent from circumventing these time limits by switching to the use of a different suspicionless border power, such as Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act, effectively doubling the existing time limits. A detained person may be fingerprinted or have other “non-intimate” samples taken from them without their consent (subject to certain conditions). Police and immigration officers with a counter-terrorism designation will be

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60 Schedule 3, paragraph 3(a) - (d).
61 Schedule 3, paragraph 16.
62 Schedule 3, paragraph 8.
63 Schedule 3, paragraph 11(1)-(2).
64 Schedule 3, paragraph 5(1).
65 Schedule 3, paragraph 4(3).
66 Schedule 3, paragraph 27. Paragraph 35 makes separate provision for fingerprints and samples to be taken if a person is detained in Scotland.
responsible for exercising the powers set out in Schedule 3.\(^{67}\) Willful failure to hand over information where it is requested under Schedule 3 powers would be a criminal offence attracting up to 51 weeks in prison.\(^{68}\)

The intrusive and suspicionless powers granted by Schedule 3 suffer from the same defects as the package of powers granted by Schedule 7. In one key respect, however, Schedule 3 is significantly more concerning. Whilst the statutory purpose set out at Schedule 7 is tied to criminal conduct, namely the “commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism”, the statutory purpose for the powers set out in Schedule 3 covers a potentially vast and conspicuously uncertain range of behaviour. The intrusive stop, questioning, search, seizure and detention powers under Section 3 are available, without individual suspicion, “for the purpose of determining whether a person appears to be a person who is, or has been, engaged in hostile activity”\(^{69}\). The Bill defines a hostile act as including any act which threatens national security, the economic well-being of the UK, or which constitutes a serious crime where the act is carried out “for, or on behalf of, a State other than the United Kingdom, or otherwise in the interests of a State other than the United Kingdom.”\(^{70}\) A person need not be aware that the activity they are engaged in constitutes hostile activity and the State that the hostile activity ostensibly benefits need not have instigated or even be aware of the activity.\(^{71}\)

The statutory purpose set out at paragraph 1 to Schedule 3 of the Bill does not offer a sensible limit on the scope of this intrusive suspicionless power. Some of the behaviour caught may amount to a crime, for example the crime of unauthorised disclosure of information under section 1 or section 4 of the Official Secrets Act 1989, or the offence of spying under section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1911. However the section also covers a huge range of entirely lawful behaviour. Somebody currently, or at any point in the past, involved in a business venture which may involve a diversion of investment from the UK to a third state would apparently be caught by Schedule 3. Their behaviour impacts the economic well-being of the UK and offers a corresponding benefit to another state. Similarly a politician or official negotiating a trade deal with the UK government which may offer some financial disadvantage for the UK and a benefit for another state would presumably be caught.

\(^{67}\) See paragraph 57(3) to Schedule 3.

\(^{68}\) Schedule 3, paragraph 16.

\(^{69}\) Schedule 3, paragraph 1(1).

\(^{70}\) Schedule 3, paragraph 1(4) - (6).

\(^{71}\) Schedule 3, paragraph 1(7).
Schedule 3 as drafted is unacceptably broad. At the very least the Government must redefine the statutory purpose set out in paragraph 1 of Schedule 3 to ensure it is focused on clearly defined criminal behaviour. Once it has clarified the criminal behaviour it intends to target under Schedule 3, the Government must introduce a threshold requiring reasonable grounds for suspicion of criminal behaviour.

Access to a lawyer

Amendment

Page 18, line 8, insert the following new Clause –

() Access to a solicitor

(1) Schedule 8 of the Terrorism Act 2000 is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph 7 omit “Subject to paragraphs 8 and 9”.
(3) In paragraph 7A -
   (a) omit sub-paragraph (3),
   (b) omit sub-paragraph (6) and insert -
       “Sub-paragraph (5) does not apply if the examining officer reasonably believes that the time it would take to consult a solicitor in person would create an immediate risk of physical injury to any person.”
   (c) in sub-paragraph (7) at end insert -
       “provided that the person is at all times able to consult with a solicitor in private.”
   (d) omit subparagraph (8).
(4) Omit paragraph 9.

Effect

This amendment would delete provisions in the Terrorism Act 2000 which restrict access to a lawyer for those detained under Schedule 7.

Amendment

Schedule 3, page 46, line 17, leave out “and 26”
Schedule 3, page 46, line 26, leave out sub-paragraph (3)
Schedule 3, page 46, line 33 leave out sub-paragraph (6) and insert -

“Sub-paragraph (5) does not apply if the examining officer reasonably believes that the time it would take to consult a solicitor in person would create an immediate risk of physical injury to any person.”

Schedule 3, page 46, line 37, at end insert -

“provided that the person is at all times able to consult with a solicitor in private.”


**Effect**

This amendment would delete provisions in the Bill which restrict access to a lawyer for those detained under Schedule 3 for the purpose of assessing whether they are or have been engaged in hostile activity.

**Briefing**

Currently both Schedule 3 of the Bill and Schedule 7 of the 2000 Act provide for access to a lawyer except where such access would be likely to prejudice the examining officer’s determinations. Individuals subject to the intrusive powers set out in both Schedules should always be able to access a lawyer before they are questioned.

Both Schedules provide that a detained person is able to consult a solicitor in person unless the examining officer believes that the time it would take to consult a solicitor in person would interfere with the examining officer’s determinations. An individual subject to powers under Schedule 7 or Schedule 3 should only be prevented from consulting a lawyer in person where the examining officer reasonably believes that the time it would take to secure a solicitor’s presence would create an immediate risk of physical injury to any individual. It is

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72 Under Schedule 3 this is a determination of whether a person is a person who appears to be or has been engaged in hostile activity and for determining the person’s presence is in a border area is connect with air travel or entry into/ departure from Great Britain or Northern Ireland. Under Schedule 7, this is a determination of whether a person is a terrorist with the meaning of section 41(1)(b) of the Terrorism Act 2000 or the determination of whether somebody’s presence in a border area is connected with his entering or leaving Northern Ireland.

73 Under Schedule 3 this is a determination of whether a person is a person who appears to be or has been engaged in hostile activity and for determining the person’s presence is in a border area is connect with air travel or entry into/ departure from Great Britain or Northern Ireland. Under Schedule 7, this is a determination of whether a person is a terrorist with the meaning of section 41(1)(b) of the Terrorism Act 2000 or the determination of whether somebody’s presence in a border area is connected with his entering or leaving Northern Ireland.
essential that an individual is still able to consult her lawyer in private, albeit that this consultation may be by phone.

More concerning still, both Schedules provide that a detained person may be required to consult her solicitor “within the sight and hearing” of an officer where a direction to this effect is made by a senior police officer. A senior officer can make a direction to this effect for a range of reasons, from concern about the impact on an investigation to situations in which she reasonably believes that the direction is necessary to avoid hindering the recovery of criminally obtained property.

Liberty does not believe there are any circumstances in which it is acceptable to require an individual to conduct private communications with a lawyer in front of a police or immigration officer. The argument for protection of legal professional privilege has been forcefully made by the Law Society’s Criminal Law Committee which expressed “very great concern” at the requirement that consultation with a solicitor may be required to take place with the sight and hearing of a lawyer, concluding:

> It fundamentally undermines… a cornerstone of our justice system—legal professional privilege… legal professional privilege is a right that belongs to the client, not to the lawyer, and it is a right to consult with their lawyer and have the contents of those discussions, where they are a matter of advice, privileged and not to be disclosed to anyone.

The Bill must be amended to protect the right to confidential legal advice in the face of the intrusive powers available at Schedule 3 of the Bill and Schedule 7 of the 2000 Act.

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74 Schedule 3, paragraph 26 to the Bill; Schedule 8, paragraph 9 to the 2000 Act.
75 Full list of consequences set out at Schedule 8 of the Terrorism Act 2000, paragraph 8(4) and Commons Public Bill Committee, 26th June 2018, Q44.