Liberty’s briefing on the Data Protection Bill 2017 for Second Reading in the House of Commons

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About Liberty

Liberty (The National Council for Civil Liberties) is one of the UK’s leading civil liberties and human rights organisations. Liberty works to promote human rights and protect civil liberties through a combination of test case litigation, lobbying, campaigning and research.

Liberty provides policy responses to Government consultations on all issues which have implications for human rights and civil liberties. We also submit evidence to Select Committees, Inquiries and other policy fora, and undertake independent, funded research.

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# CONTENTS

**Introduction**........................................................................................................................................4

**Delegated powers**................................................................................................................................5

**The “immigration control” exemption**.................................................................................................9
   The scope of the exemption: “wide-ranging, and open to abuse”.........................................................10
   A full-frontal attack on access to justice...............................................................................................14
   The context: a “hostile environment” underpinned by shadowy data-sharing agreements.................................................................15
   Home Office propensity to error.............................................................................................................17
   The exemption’s compatibility with EU law and human rights law......................................................18

**Exemptions to the right not to be subject to automated decision-making**.................................21
   The threat to human rights from purely automated decision-making....................................................21
   The critical distinction between automated data processing and automated decision-making.................................24
   The Bill’s safeguards on automated decision-making are inadequate................................................25

**The national security exemptions**..................................................................................................26
   The lack of a definition of “national security” and “defence purposes” .............................................26
   The lack of independent oversight of national security certificates....................................................28
   The lack of independent oversight of the intelligence services...........................................................29

**Data Processing Framework for Government**...............................................................................30
INTRODUCTION
This briefing sets out the following proposals:

- To **remove excessively broad delegations** of law-making power to the Secretary of State
- To **maintain individuals’ basic data rights** where data is being processed for the “maintenance of effective immigration control”, or “the investigation or detection of activities that would interfere with effective immigration control”
- To **protect individuals from being subjected to significant automated decisions** that engage their fundamental rights
- To **define “defence purposes” and “national security”** in order to restrict worryingly broad exemptions to people’s data protection rights on these bases
- To ensure **adequate oversight** of national security certificates and the intelligence services more generally in relation to their data processing practices
- To **remove overly broad powers to create an unnecessary Data Processing Framework for Government**, or at the very least to involve Parliament meaningfully in its drafting.
DELEGATED POWERS

In its current form, the Data Protection Bill grants unacceptable power to Ministers to create statutory instruments that are highly likely to undermine the Bill’s legislative scheme by creating new exemptions to data protection rights not considered or endorsed by Parliament. Liberty is particularly concerned by the sweeping powers granted to the Secretary of State by clauses 10(6), 16, 35(6), 86(3) and 113; described by one member of the House of Lords during the Bill’s Committee Stage as a “constitutional car crash”.1

The core purpose of this Bill is to strike a balance between individuals’ right to data privacy and the proper use of data by defining the legitimate reasons that a person’s data may be collected and processed, and setting important procedural safeguards on that collection and processing.

To that end, Schedules 2, 3, and 4 of the Bill set forth several exemptions from individual data protection rights, many of which are themselves the subject of significant debate by this Parliament. But clause 16 of the Bill would grant to the Secretary of State additional power to add further exemptions, or vary existing ones, for a broad range of reasons generally relating to vaguely-defined purposes such as “the public interest,” or “the exercise of official authority,” without any guarantee of meaningful Parliamentary debate, scrutiny or amendment.

The Bill also delegates broad powers to expand permissible processing of sensitive personal data, including data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, genetic or biometric data, health data, and data concerning a person’s sex life or sexual orientation.

Consistent with the GDPR, the Bill allows processing of sensitive personal data only for defined, considered purposes and places procedural protections on such processing. However, clauses 10(6), 35(6) and 86(3) delegate power to unilaterally “vary” the conditions and safeguards governing the general processing of sensitive personal data in Schedule 1, and to “add” new “conditions” to Schedules 1, 8 and 10, which would have the effect of expanding the permissible reasons for allowing the processing of sensitive personal data both generally and for law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

1 Lord McNally in Data Protection Bill Committee Stage in the House of Lords, 15th November 2017 – Hansard, vol. 785, col 1638
Finally, clause 113 delegates unlimited authority to create new exemptions to Part 4 of the Bill, which governs processing by intelligence agencies by permitting the Secretary of State to vary or add to the existing list of exemptions set forth in Schedule 11 without limitation.

The Constitutional Committee and the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee of the House of Lords have expressed serious concerns about the scope of these delegated powers. The Constitutional Committee noted that:

“The Government’s desire to future-proof legislation, both in light of Brexit and the rapidly changing nature of digital technologies, must be balanced against the need for Parliament to scrutinise and, where necessary, constrain executive power.”2

The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee went further, arguing:

“[I]t is not good enough for Government to say that they need “flexibility” to pass laws by secondary instead of primary legislation without explaining in detail why this is necessary — particularly in the case of widely-drawn Henry VIII powers. While we recognise that the affirmative procedure would apply to regulations under clauses 15 and 111 [clauses 16 and 113 of the Bill as brought forward from the House of Lords], this is not an adequate substitute for a Bill allowing Parliament fully to scrutinise proposed new exemptions to data obligations and rights.”3

In response to the Committees’ concerns and debate during Committee Stage in the House of Lords, the Government laid amendments to the delegated powers clauses at Report Stage. Regrettably, those amendments are meaningless. They removed the word “omit” from the list of Minister’s ability to “add, vary or omit” conditions and exemptions to data privacy rights in the original Bill, granting power of omission only in relation to conditions and exemptions added by the exercise of delegated power. But this does nothing to address the fundamental concern, which is that Ministers will be able to add new exemptions to the long list of exemptions to data privacy rights currently codified in the Schedules to the Bill.

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Moreover, Ministers can achieve any change that might have been characterised as an “omission” by instead drafting it as a “variance” of a condition or exemption. As Lord Clement-Jones noted:

“[V]ariation can be extremely broad and virtually equivalent to omitting. It seems that one can vary a right all the way down to a minuscule situation which can impinge on the human rights of an individual, even though it is not technically an omission where a safeguarded is provided.”

The Government acknowledged that its amendment falls far short of what was proposed by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. Baroness Chisholm, speaking for the Government, argued that:

“[A]ccepting the Committee’s recommendations in full would leave the Government unable to accommodate developments in data processing and the changing requirements of certain sectors. This in turn could render the UK at a disadvantage internationally if, for example, we were unable to make appropriate future provision for sectors, including those such as insurance, where the UK is a world leader, to reflect advances and changes in their approach to data processing.”

But the Government does not explain why it should be the decision of the Secretary of State rather than Parliament to alter the framework of data protection in the UK in response to external developments. In this Bill, Parliament has set out general principles and frameworks designed to balance individual privacy with the valid reasons for processing sensitive personal data, and it is for Parliament to decide, in this Bill, how to strike that balance. Parliament should not abdicate that responsibility and empower Government to fundamentally recalibrate the approach. Secondary legislation may be necessary and appropriate to interpret and implement the application of the Bill’s general principles in particular contexts, but there is no persuasive argument for permitting Ministers to constantly alter the legislative framework governing data protection in response to every technological development or every call from a representative of the insurance industry.

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4 Lord Clement-Jones in Data Protection Bill Report Stage in the House of Lords, 11th December 2017 – Hansard, vol. 785, col 1467
5 Baroness Chisholm in Data Protection Bill Report Stage in the House of Lords, 11th December 2017 – Hansard vol 785, col 1464-65
Moreover, the delegated powers in the Bill are not limited to making amendments to keep up with changes in the industrial and business sectors. They also allow Ministers to revise the data protection rules governing their own departments—especially in the law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Yet the Government has not sufficiently justified removing legislative control over how Government departments themselves recalibrate data protection rights over time. The fact that technology changes quickly cannot justify eroding democratic control over the actions of Government agencies.

This delegation of power is even more unprecedented when considered in the context of the pending EU (Withdrawal) Bill, which, in combination with this Bill, risks eliminating the GDPR as a check on the misuse of ministerial authority to undermine data privacy rights. The EU (Withdrawal) Bill gives Ministers power to make secondary legislation to amend any “retained EU law” – which would include a variety of critical EU directives governing data protection rights that should continue to apply in the UK through the incorporation provisions of that Bill. The Withdrawal Bill, as currently drafted, also eliminates an important data protection right contained in the Charter on Fundamental Rights: Article 8, which would otherwise constrain ministers’ ability to erode fundamental data privacy protections.

Through both of these Bills, the Government is attempting to arrogate to itself the power to eliminate all rights-based barriers to the exercise of governmental power to process personal data. Parliament should not cede such unprecedented power to it.

Liberty strongly recommends that Parliamentarians remove clauses 10(6), 16, 35(6), 86(3) and 113 from the Bill. Data protection rights are of increasing importance in many areas of human rights – where their amendment or removal is concerned, parliamentary control must not be bypassed.

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6 European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, Schedule 8, paragraph (3), page 55, line 33
7 European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, Clause 5(4), page 3, line 20. As the court noted in Davis v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWHC 2092, the Charter “clearly goes further, is more specific, and has no counterpart” in other privacy laws.
THE “IMMIGRATION CONTROL” EXEMPTION

The GDPR, which this Data Protection Bill applies, allows Member States a margin of appreciation within which to adapt it to national circumstances.

Schedule 2, part 1, paragraph 4 of the Bill, hereafter referred to as “the immigration control exemption,” proposes to create a new exemption from individuals’ data protection rights when their personal information is processed for:

a) the maintenance of effective immigration control,\(^8\) or
b) the investigation or detection of activities that would interfere with effective immigration control,\(^9\)

to the extent that the fulfilment of their rights would prejudice these activities. The exemption would affect the rights and principles listed at paragraph one of schedule 2;\(^10\) they are summarised as follows and set out in full in the GDPR:

- right to information (Article 13(1)-(3))
- right to information where data is obtained from a third party (Article 14(1)-(4))
- right of subject access (Article 15(1)-(3))
- right to erasure (Article 17(1)-(2))
- right to restriction of processing (Article 18(1))
- right to object (Article 21(1))
- principle of lawful, fair and transparent processing (Article 5(1)(a))
- principle of purpose limitation (Article 5(1)(b))
- the data protection principles set out under Article 5: lawfulness, fairness, transparency, purpose limitation, data minimisation, accuracy, storage limitation, integrity, confidentiality and accountability, to the extent that they correspond to the rights set out above.

While the Home Office is most likely to apply and benefit from the exemption, to the extent that it outsources immigration control functions to private companies or other entities (as it

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\(^8\) Data Protection Bill 2017 (as brought from the House of Lords), Schedule 2, Part 1, paragraph 4(1)(a)
\(^9\) Data Protection Bill 2017, Schedule 2, Part 1, paragraph 4(1)(b)
\(^10\) Data Protection Bill 2017, Schedule 2, Part 1, paragraph 1(a)-(b)
does to G4S to run immigration detention centres), those entities could also apply and benefit from it.\textsuperscript{11}

Sub-paragraphs 3 and 4 of paragraph 4 exempt data controllers that process and share data with a second controller for the purposes of immigration control or investigation of activities that would undermine it from their obligations under GDPR Articles 13(1)-(3), 14(1)-(4), 15(1)-(3) and Article 5, to the extent that the second controller is also exempt from the generally applicable safeguards contained in those GDPR provisions. What these sub-paragraphs mean is that the exemption may apply to any entity from whom the Home Office obtains data for immigration control purposes, which could include public authorities, profit-making data brokers, corporate entities, or third sector organisations, should the Home Office hold or conclude in future data-sharing agreements with them. Indeed, the Home Office has already concluded such an agreement – with Cifas, a third sector anti-fraud organisation, with whom it shares data to ensure that people without leave to remain in the UK cannot access bank accounts.\textsuperscript{12}

\textit{The scope of the exemption: “wide-ranging, and open to abuse”}

There is no equivalent provision in the current Data Protection Act, and as the Joint Committee on Human Rights has noted, the exemption represents “a departure from the current regime.”\textsuperscript{13} This is not the first time that Government has attempted to limit data protection rights on immigration control grounds. Clause 28 of the 1983 Data Protection Bill had an identical aim, setting out broad exemptions to data subjects’ rights on grounds of crime, national security and immigration control. The Data Protection Committee, then chaired by Sir Norman Lindop, said that the clause would be “a palpable fraud upon the public if [it] were allowed to become law”\textsuperscript{14} because it allowed data acquired for one purpose to be processed for another.

\textsuperscript{11} Data Protection Bill 2017, Schedule 2, Part 1, paragraph 4, sub-paragraphs (3) and (4) – page137, lines 12-29
\textsuperscript{13} Joint Committee on Human Rights, Note From Deputy Counsel: The Human Rights Implications of the Data Protection Bill, 6 December 2017: https://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/human-rights/correspondence/2017-19/Note_Deputy_Counsel_DPBill.pdf at paragraph 50
In the House of Lords, Lord Avebury raised concerns almost synonymous with those that we raise today, namely that:

“[T]he provision is in danger of being oppressive, deeply worrying to the immigrant community living among us, and one which is in grave danger of infringing the provisions of the [European Convention on Human Rights].”

Clause 28 was rightfully removed from the 1983 Bill. However, we see it resurrected today in even more startling breadth as paragraph 4 of Schedule 2.

During the earlier stages of this Bill, both the Information Commissioner’s Office, the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and Peers of almost every stripe expressed concerns regarding the scope and purpose of the exemption. Lord Clement-Jones described it as “wide-ranging” and “open to abuse.” Lord Lucas went further, arguing that:

“You start to undermine the Bill in all sorts of insidious ways by having such a broad and unjustified clause—unjustified in the sense that no one has made a justification for it. I really hope that the Home Office will think again.”

Amendments were made by Government to remove the rights to rectification (Article 16) and to data portability (Article 20) from the “listed provisions” affected by this exemption. Nevertheless, it remains Liberty’s view that these amendments do not go far enough and that the exemption continues to pose a grave risk to the rights of those affected by it.

The Government argued as the Bill passed through the House of Lords that the exemption is “targeted” and contains a safeguard insofar as sub-paragraph (1) sets out that an individual’s rights will only be exempted “to the extent that the application of those provisions would be likely to prejudice any of the matters mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b).” This

15 Lord Avebury, ibid.
17 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Note From Deputy Counsel: The Human Rights Implications of the Data Protection Bill, 6 December 2017: https://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/human-rights/correspondence/2017-19/Note_Deputy_Counsel_DPBill.pdf at paragraph 9(i)
18 Lord Clement-Jones, Committee debate [HL], 13 November 2017, Hansard, vol. 785, col. 1909
19 Lord Lucas, Committee debate [HL], 13 November 2017, Hansard, vol. 785, col. 1911
20 Data Protection Bill, Schedule 2, Part 1, paragraph 4(1)
is no safeguard at all. Without a statutory definition of “prejudice to immigration controls”, which is particularly perplexing as a non-criminal category, it is far from clear that the use of the exemption would in fact be an exception rather than the norm, given especially that the Home Office – the beneficiary of the exemption – is the adjudicator of when it should apply. Furthermore, as demonstrated by recent political swings not only in the UK but in the US and elsewhere, “effective immigration control” is a highly subjective goal, with the parameters and the effects on individuals’ human rights vulnerable to political tides. In Liberty’s view it is highly inappropriate to predicate the eradication of basic rights on such a broad, undefined and subjective basis.

Moreover, immigrants are not the only people who may find themselves stripped of data protection rights under the exemption. The exemption does not attach itself to any particular class of person, such as non-UK nationals, but rather to any person whose data is processed for immigration control purposes. This Government, or a future Government, may decide that checking every individual’s immigration status as they interact with public services, employers, landlords, or banks is necessary for “the maintenance of effective immigration control”. In such a set of circumstances, people of all immigration statuses would find themselves liable to be subject to the exemption, if the Home Office judged it necessary to apply it, stripped of their rights to ask what information is held about them, from whom the Home Office obtained it, or to request that it be deleted or not be used for a particular purpose. Without a statutory definition of “the maintenance of effective immigration control”, the exemption is virtually open-ended.

While the exemption does not in itself create new powers to share data, it allows data-sharing agreements to operate in secret by virtue of sub-paragraphs 3 and 4. In practice, this removes a significant barrier to data-sharing: the obligation to notify an individual that their data has been passed to a third party. In conjunction with the broad statutory gateway for data-sharing between government departments and “specified persons” created by Part 5 of the Digital Economy Act, it has the potential to facilitate unscrutinised and unchallengeable bulk data-sharing on everyone in society, in effect paving the way for a digital ID card.

The entrenchment and extension of the principle that individuals’ personal data collected for one purpose can be used by Government for another without their informed consent sets a damaging precedent for the privacy rights of each and every one of us. To reuse data for a
secondary purpose that is incompatible with the original purpose, without a person’s consent, would be a clear disregard of the very core of data protection in the UK.

It is alarming moreover that the immigration control exemption is untethered from any notion of criminality or wrongdoing. The Government is yet to provide an example of an instance in which the exemption would be applied that is not a situation involving criminality. As Baroness Hamwee pointed out during the debate at Report Stage:

“In Committee, the Minister asserted its necessity and gave two examples: a suspected overstayer and the provision of false information. Both are criminal offences and can be dealt with under the other provisions of the schedule.”

Several activities associated with undocumented people are offences under the criminal law including working, driving, or simply overstaying a visa. The Government already invokes the law enforcement exemption at section 29 of the Data Protection Act 1998 to justify the secrecy of the bulk data-sharing agreements that it uses to obtain up-to-date contact details for individuals suspected of committing an immigration offence from trusted sources such as children’s school records and confidential patient medical records, discussed further below. It is Liberty’s view that the existing exemption on data protection obligations on law enforcement grounds should be narrowed to exclude low-level offences relating to immigration, and that personal information collected by essential public services should be firewalled from immigration enforcement. However, until that is the case, the Government will retain the power to limit individuals’ data protection rights in circumstances where they are suspected of committing a breach of the criminal law by virtue of the crime exemption set out in schedule 2, part 1, paragraph 2 of this Bill. This freestanding immigration control exemption is therefore wholly unnecessary.

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21 Baroness Hamwee, Report debate [HL], December 2017, Hansard, vol. 785, col. 1589
22 Immigration Act 2016, Section 34
23 Immigration Act 2016, Section 44
24 Immigration Act 1971, Section 24
A full-frontal attack on access to justice

The immigration control exemption also means data controllers, including the Home Office, would not be obliged to respond to subject access requests (SARs) from people wishing to know what data about them is retained, if the Home Office determines that responding would engage the exemption. SARs are used by legal practitioners to acquire information necessary to advise individuals, and particularly undocumented individuals, as to their current immigration status and to give further legal advice to an individual on that basis, especially in circumstances where people no longer have their own record of previous representations. The Government has stated that the Home Office will consider each application for subject access on its individual merits.27 This means that the data controller most likely to benefit from the application of the exemption – the Home Office - will also be the entity deciding whether or not it applies. A right that is contingent on Government largesse is no right at all. The effects of its loss will be devastating.

Existing Home Office practice in failing to fulfil SARs fully and in a timely way already produces significantly deleterious effects for lawyers and their clients. The Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (JCWI) conducted a survey to assess to what extent this was evidence of a systemic issue. In May 2017 it wrote28 to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) requesting an urgent review of Home Office practice in fulfilling its Data Protection Act obligations on the basis of its findings. As JCWI states in its letter to the ICO:

“All 42 respondents had experienced issues with Home Office staff failing to provide full or adequate disclosure to SARs[…]. Crucially, 26 of the 42 respondents stated that this happened every single time they made a SAR. A further 5 indicated that this happened almost every time, or the majority of the time. Of the 9 remaining respondents most indicated that this was something that occurred on a regular basis.”29

JCWI further sets out the human and procedural cost of these failures, stating that

“Combined with breaches of the 40-day time limit [these failures mean that] immigration cases often cannot progress expeditiously. The information needed for a

27 Baroness Williams of Trafford in Data Protection Bill Committee Stage in the House of Lords, 13th November 2017 – Hansard, vol. 785, col.1914
29 JCWI, ibid.
client’s case is often only available on the Home Office file, and the Home Office failure to disclose that information makes it impossible for the case to progress.

Our respondents reported the following impacts of this practice:

- It prolongs periods of destitution for vulnerable migrants such as asylum seekers. This results in immense hardship to vulnerable people, including causing street homelessness;
- Without the file the client’s immigration history is unclear, so they cannot be advised to their status, and remain vulnerable;
- Clients in immigration detention are particularly impacted by this inability to advise, as the uncertainty is even more damaging when their liberty hangs in the balance.\(^30\)

The proposed immigration control exemption will likely multiply these effects on an exponential scale. It will prevent those with unclear or precarious status from regularising their status, which is surely an activity that the Home Office wishes to encourage in its work to maintain effective immigration control. In this regard, the exemption is not only deeply damaging to the individuals affected, it is also self-defeating.

**The context: a “hostile environment” underpinned by shadowy data-sharing agreements**

Since 2012, the Home Office has operated with a public commitment to creating a “hostile environment”\(^31\) for undocumented migrants. Its effects reverberate well beyond its stated target group to affect migrants with regular status, settled black and minority ethnic (BAME) communities, and indeed the very fabric of the society in which we live through the requirement it imposes on public servants and private citizens to check individuals’ entitlements to goods and services, as well as the racially discriminatory impacts routinely felt by individuals who are subject to such checks.\(^32\)

\(^{30}\) JCWI, ibid.


\(^{32}\) A 2017 report by the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, Passport Please, found that an enquiry from a British Black Minority Ethnic (BME) tenant without a passport was ignored or turned down by 58% of landlords, in a mystery shopping exercise. Available here: https://www.jcwi.org.uk/sites/default/files/2017-02/2017_02_13_JCWI%20Report_ Passport%20Please.pdf
Data-sharing schemes currently operate to allow the Home Office to use children’s school records and confidential medical records to obtain up-to-date contact details for people who are suspected of committing an immigration offence. Until early last year, the Greater London Authority (GLA) also shared aggregated, sensitive personal data collected by homelessness outreach services with the Home Office in the form of a map to facilitate enforcement activity against migrant rough sleepers, under a former Home Office policy that has now been deemed unlawful. It has also been reported that in some circumstances, police have shared the personal information of victims of crime with Home Office immigration enforcement – in one circumstance in relation to a survivor of rape. The impact of one of these data-sharing schemes was set out in harrowing detail earlier in January during an oral evidence session of the Health Committee’s inquiry into the Memorandum of Understanding on data sharing between NHS Digital and the Home Office, with a support project for domestic workers, Voice Of Domestic Workers, recounting the story of a woman who, having been held in domestic servitude and abused by her employer, subsequently died because she feared that seeking medical care would make her vulnerable to immigration enforcement. Across the board, individuals are not informed when they interact with frontline services that their data may be processed in this way, in part because the Home Office relies on the crime exemption at section 29 of the Data Protection Act to avoid fulfilling data subjects’ rights, and crucially, because many frontline workers are unaware of the existence of these data-sharing agreements. Bulk data-sharing also occurs in relation to bank accounts, driving licences, and benefits and employment. The overall effect of this information sharing is the destruction of vital trust between frontline workers and people interacting with essential

36 Politics.co.uk, Met police hands victims of crime over to the Home Office for immigration enforcement, 5 April 2017: http://www.politics.co.uk/news/2017/04/05/met-police-hands-victims-of-crime-over-to-the-home-office
37 The Huffington Post, Dying Migrants Too Scared To See A Doctor For Fear Of Deportation, MPs Are Warned, 16 January 2018: http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/dying-migrants-too-scared-to-see-a-doctor-for-fear-of-deportation-mps-are-warned_5a5e1f26e4b0fcbc3a13c963
39 ICIBI, ibid.
services. That the secret sharing of information could be dramatically facilitated by this exemption, targeting lawful migrants and British citizens as well as undocumented people, is incredibly worrying.

*Home Office propensity to error*

There is already evidence to suggest that “hostile environment” measures in general, and existing data-sharing schemes administered by the Home Office specifically, involve a rate of error which, given the adversity of the consequences for affected individuals, who may well have leave to remain in the UK, should be considered significant. As the Home Affairs Select Committee recently remarked, the hostile environment as a policy “is unclear, and, in some instances, too open to interpretation and inadvertent error.”

The Committee further acknowledged that “these errors [can be] deeply damaging and distressing to those involved.” Consider, for example, the rates of error in the Home Office’s scheme to prevent undocumented people from accessing bank accounts. The Immigration Act 2014 prohibits banks from opening current accounts for undocumented individuals, and requires them to use a third-party database to check individuals’ eligibility. A 2016 investigation by the Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration found that of a sample of 169 refusals to open bank accounts, 10% of refusals had been made in error.

One of those refusals involved a Jamaican national with leave to remain in the UK, who had been lawfully present in the country for over a decade.

These errors are not confined to entitlement checks for current accounts. *The Guardian* recently reported on the case of Dr Mohsen Danaie, an Iranian-Canadian research scientist working for the UK’s Diamond Light Source. Dr Danaie holds a valid work visa, due to run out in September 2019. In September this year, he received a letter from Home Office Immigration Enforcement telling him that he had “no lawful basis to be in the UK”, that his driving licence would be revoked, and that he would be subject to forcible removal if he did not leave the UK voluntarily. The wrongful notification clearly was the result of inaccurate records being held either by the Home Office or the DVLA, and shared between the two agencies without Dr Danaie’s knowledge.

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41 Home Affairs Select Committee, *Immigration policy: basis for building consensus*, January 2018
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmhaff/500/500.pdf paragraph 57

42 Home Affairs Select Committee, ibid.

43 ICIBI, op. cit.

44 *The Guardian*, “Leave UK immediately’: scientist is latest victim of Home Office blunder’, 26 September 2017
In autumn 2012 the Home Office contracted a private company, Capita, to contact individuals suspected of being in the UK without the requisite leave. Approximately 39,000 texts were sent advising those individuals that they were believed to be in the UK unlawfully. Some of them were advised to make plans to leave, causing them significant distress. The data provided to Capita by the Home Office was clearly of poor quality, as it resulted in several individuals with outstanding applications or leave to remain in the UK being contacted, including veteran anti-racism campaigner Suresh Grover. Hundreds of complaints were filed. This incident is a stark demonstration of why companies contracted to fulfil immigration control functions must be subject to the same data protection obligations as the rest of the Government, especially if the accuracy of the records they receive from the Home Office cannot be relied upon.

The Government’s direction of travel is clearly towards the increased use of data, bulk-sharing across departments, and automation in its exercise of immigration control functions. As a Home Office official recently remarked before the Public Accounts Committee, “immigration enforcement is another area where we have more data available to us, and we are making more use of that data, and have plans to make more use of that.” It is astonishing that such measures could be implemented at the same time as the safeguards that would help uphold such a system – data subjects’ rights – are at risk of being removed.

The exemption’s compatibility with EU law and human rights law

During Committee Stage in the House of Lords, Baroness Williams describes the immigration control exemption in the Bill as “a necessary and proportionate measure to protect the integrity of our immigration system”.

The existence of this exemption means that an individual could be wrongly determined as having no leave to be in the country, or refused access to essential public services, without knowing what information was used to make that decision about them, to correct it or to ask

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48 Patsy Wilkinson, Second Permanent Secretary to the Home Office, response to Question 64. Public Accounts Committee, Oral evidence: Brexit and the Borders, HC 558 20/11/2017
49 Baroness Williams of Trafford in Data Protection Bill Committee Stage in the House of Lords, 13th November 2017 – Hansard, vol. 785, col.1913
for it to be deleted. These are very serious effects and have a significant impact on a person’s fundamental human rights. As Dr Mohsen Danaie, the research scientist whose case is discussed above, asked:

“How could they possibly get my name wrong, but my address right? Did someone just type that information off a physical dossier? How advanced is the infrastructure at the Home Office? Should we not fear for our safety?”

The Government has done little to demonstrate why an immigration control exemption over and above the existing law enforcement exemption is necessary. Nor has it attempted any proportionality analysis. It has made no attempt to show why the detriment suffered by an individual through the removal of their data protection rights is a proportionate way of meeting legitimate immigration control aims. Nor has it attempted to show that the detriment to other public policy objectives (such as the protection of public health or safety) caused by the removal of data protection rights is proportionate.

While the exemption is construed so widely that it may affect individuals of any immigration status, non-UK nationals are significantly more likely than UK nationals to have their data processed for immigration control purposes. It is therefore highly likely to be discriminatory on the grounds of race and nationality to the extent that it establishes a lesser data protection regime for non-UK nationals, thus engaging Article 14 of the ECHR in conjunction with Article 8. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights also protects individuals’ rights to private and family life, data protection, and non-discrimination by virtue of its Articles 7, 8 and 21 respectively.

The Government’s future partnership paper on the exchange and protection of personal data outlines its desire to ensure that the UK’s data protection framework is adequate for the free flow of data between the UK and the European Union (EU) to continue after the UK leaves the EU in March 2019. But the inclusion of an immigration control exemption in the Bill jeopardises that entire endeavour. The Government describes this exemption as one made under Article 23 of the GDPR. Yet the GDPR makes no express provision for exemption to data subjects’ rights on immigration control grounds. Article 23(1) sets out a

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51 HM Government, ‘The exchange and protection of personal data: a future partnership paper’ 24 August 2017:

52 Baroness Williams of Trafford in Data Protection Bill Committee Stage in the House of Lords, 13th November 2017 – Hansard, vol. 785, col.1913
number of legitimate aims in the pursuit of which a state may make exemptions to data subjects’ rights, such as national security and defence. Although Article 23(1)(e) of the GDPR allows Member States to restrict subjects' rights to safeguard “other important objectives of general public interest of the Union or of a Member State, in particular an important economic or financial interest of the Union or of a Member State, including monetary, budgetary and taxation matters, public health and social security”, no express mention is made of immigration control, and the Government has made no attempt to explain why it considers that immigration control is a legitimate aim for the purposes of Article 23.

An exemption is permitted under Article 23(1), if and only if it “respects the essence of the fundamental rights and freedoms and is a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society.”\textsuperscript{53} Lack of necessity, proportionality, and a risk to fundamental human rights and freedoms have been highlighted above. But even if the exemption were not incompatible with human rights as set out by the Charter and the Convention, Article 23(2) of the GDPR stipulates that where relevant, the exemptions it provides for should include a number of procedural provisions, including provisions as to:

- (c) the scope of the restrictions introduced
- (d) the safeguards to prevent abuse or unlawful access or transfer
- (g) the risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects.\textsuperscript{54}

No meaningful attempt has been made by the Government to include provisions to this effect in the Bill. The exemption is therefore highly unlikely to meet the requirements of Article 23 of the GDPR on several grounds. And thus the pursuit of adequacy in data protection arrangements, like so many other important public policy objectives, is defeated by the Government’s attempt to bring border controls into every aspect of our lives no matter the cost.

\textsuperscript{53} GDPR, Article 23(1)
\textsuperscript{54} GDPR, Article 23(2)
AUTOMATED DECISION-MAKING

Clauses 14, 50, 96 and 97 must be amended to prevent data controllers making decisions that affect human rights by purely automated means. A human should be meaningfully involved in any decision that engages a person’s human rights.

Article 22 of the GDPR sets out a right not to be subject to purely automated decision-making:

“The data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.”

The GDPR permits UK law to create some exemptions to this right, provided that that law “lays down suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms and legitimate interests.”

Clauses 14 and 50 of the Bill establish that, for purposes of general processing and law enforcement processing of data, automated decision-making is allowed where it is “authorised by law”, and (a) notice is given to the person affected (clause 14(4)(a)), and (b) the person may seek reconsideration or a new decision not based solely on automated processing (clauses 14(4)(b), 14(5)).

Liberty urges Parliament to consider an amendment to these clauses prohibiting decisions based solely on automated processing of data, where those decisions engage rights protected by the Human Rights Act 1998.

The threat to human rights from purely automated decision-making

Human rights protected by the Human Rights Act 1998 should be safeguarded rigorously. There is no justification for permitting those rights to be assessed or affected by decisions

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55 GDPR, Article 22(1)
56 GDPR, Article 22(2)(b)
57 Under section 12 of the Data Protection Act 1998, people have a qualified right not to be subject to purely automated decision making. To the extent that automated decisions are permitted, people have a right to access information relating to such decisions about them.
that involve no human judgment or review, even with the “safeguards” that the Government has proposed.

Automated decisions have the potential to discriminate. The notion that algorithms and software are neutral or objective has been exposed as a fallacy. Google’s translation algorithm translates ungendered languages in a manner that perpetuates gender stereotypes; the algorithms governing voice-based assistants like Amazon’s Alexa struggle with certain accents; Netflix’s recommendation algorithm incorporates class biases; and a “Microsoft chatbot on Twitter started spewing racist posts after learning from other users on the platform.”\(^\text{58}\) An investigation into software marketed for predicting risk of reoffending revealed that it was twice as likely to be inaccurate when assessing black people than white people.\(^\text{59}\)

These tools also threaten to perpetuate discrimination by giving data processors access to private information people had no intention of disclosing. A recent study suggested that a facial recognition tool was able to ‘detect’ people’s sexuality based on photographs taken from online dating sites with greater accuracy than humans.\(^\text{60}\) Another recent study claimed that a machine learning tool was able to diagnose depression by scanning people’s photos posted on the social media platform Instagram with greater accuracy than the average doctor.\(^\text{61}\) The rapidly growing field of machine learning and algorithmic decision making clearly presents new and very serious risks.

During the debate in the House of Lords, Lord Lucas pointed to the risks that automated decision-making may perpetuate discrimination:

“We have made so much effort in my lifetime and we have got so much better at being equal—of course, we have a fair way to go—doing our best continually to make things better with regard to discrimination. It is therefore important that we do

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\(^{60}\) Deep neural networks are more accurate than humans at detecting sexual orientation from facial images (preprint) - Yilun Wang & Michal Kosinski, OSF, 15 Feb 2017

\(^{61}\) Instagram photos reveal predictive markers of depression - Andrew G Reece & Christopher M Danforth, EPJ Data Science, 8 August 2017
not allow ourselves to go backwards because we do not understand what is going on inside a computer.”

Baroness Jones argued further:

“We must have the vital safeguard for human rights of the requirement of human involvement. After the automated decision-making result has come out, there has to be a human who says whether or not it is reasonable.”

The authorisation of automated decision-making in the law enforcement environment is especially concerning. A broad range of significant decisions made by police and security services—from stops to searches to arrests—are “authorised by law,” meaning that the Bill as drafted allows police to make almost *any* decision based solely on automated processing. This could include decisions to arrest, deny bail, issue search warrants, conduct surveillance, add people to the Gangs Matrix (a database of suspected gang members maintained by the Metropolitan Police) or other databases used to inform various law enforcement actions.

Decisions made by computers rather than by humans undermine democratic accountability. As Baroness Jones noted,

“After all the automated processing has been carried out, a human has to decide whether or not it is a reasonable decision to proceed. In this way we know where the decision lay and where the responsibility lies. No one can ever say, ‘We messed up your human rights. We interfered with your human rights and it is the computer’s fault.’”

Parliament should be very wary of expanding the role for automated decision-making in our society. Increasingly, academics are raising concerns of the risks of turning over policy to computers and artificial intelligence. As two experts in health policy recently noted:

“Automation in digital systems and sub-systems . . . is creating a new type of social regulation, one that is (deliberately) unmediated by human compassion or even the

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62 Lord Lucas in Data Protection Bill Committee Stage in the House of Lords, 13th November 2017 – Hansard, vol. 785, col.1874
63 Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb in Data Protection Bill Committee Stage in the House of Lords, 13th November 2017 – Hansard, vol. 785, col.1867
64 Ibid., col. 1578.
consideration of individual circumstances. This is social policy as an *iron cage*: designed, implemented and monitored via digital mechanisms that can operate in ways that leave them unaccountable to the public, designed with features developed with social regulation foremost in mind. As we have noted elsewhere, this is coercive big data in action.”

The critical distinction between automated data processing and automated decision-making

An amendment to prohibit automated decision-making where decisions engaged human rights would not affect anyone’s ability to engage in automated data processing. Data controllers would have unfettered ability to use automated data processing tools in any number of ways—including to make recommended decisions, so long as a human is meaningfully involved in those final decisions. For example, a police department could, consistent with the amendment, use an algorithm to assist in assessing patterns of criminal activity in order to inform deployment decisions. But those deployment decisions—and any subsequent operational decisions that flowed from such deployment—must be made by humans. Likewise, public health authorities could use automated data processing to generate information about where certain public health interventions are likely to have the most impact. But the decision about how to actually distribute public health resources must be made by humans.

Automated data processing may well have a significant role to play in making law enforcement—and other parts of government—more effective and efficient. Where automated tools are not prone to error or bias, they may wisely be used to *inform* law enforcement decisions rather than *make* those decisions. Tools such as risk assessment algorithms and facial recognition technology are currently being trialled for purposes of *supporting* officers’ decisions on issues such as setting bail and making arrests. There is no operational case for authorising law enforcement to replace human decision-making with automated decision-making.  

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66 For example: “While HART forecasts support the custody officer’s decision making, they quite explicitly do not remove the officer’s discretion” - written evidence submitted by Durham Constabulary (ALG0041; para. 7) in response to the Science and Technology Committee’s inquiry into algorithms in decision making – April 2017: http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/science-and-technology-committee/algorithms-in-decisionmaking/written/69063.html
The Bill’s safeguards on automated decision-making are inadequate

The Bill’s provision for post-hoc human review, on request by the affected party should they be informed of the automated decision process, is a welcome development but is not sufficient. The burden should not be on individuals to address the threat posed by automated decision-making. Concerns about discrimination, fairness, legitimacy and democratic accountability go beyond any one individual.

In particular, individual challenges to automated decision-making cannot address the risks that automated decisions will perpetuate discrimination or disproportionately harm certain communities. Such discrimination will not be revealed in ad hoc review of individual decisions, nor could the harm from discrimination be adequately remedied through case-by-case review. Liberty strongly recommends that exemptions to the prohibition on automated decision-making are amended to ensure that in all circumstances, human rights are protected by meaningful safeguards.
NATIONAL SECURITY EXEMPTIONS

The current Bill provides for overly broad and excessively vague exemptions to nearly all of its data protection rules and privacy safeguards, as well as to the rules and safeguards of the applied GDPR, based on national security (and defence). The Bill does not provide any definition of the terms “national security” or “defence.” These exemptions are not, on the surface, limited to the UK’s intelligence and security services, but—by applying to Part 2, which deals with “general processing” of people’s data—broadly permit public authorities and even private corporations to invoke national security and defence as a reason to cast aside privacy rights. Whether an action involving personal data falls within these exemptions is determined solely by a Minister issuing a national security certificate, reviewable only by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal applying a judicial review standard that cannot second-guess the Minister’s discretionary determinations.

The Government has not provided any justification for the breadth and indeterminate meaning of the national security exemption. In response to amendments laid in the House of Lords to limit the exemption, the Government merely noted that the Data Protection Act 1998 also contains a national security exemption. That is no response to the significant legal and policy concerns raised by the undefined scope of and lack of safeguards around the exemption, particularly in light of developments in Government practice, case law since 1998 and the GDPR itself, which did not exist in 1998. Moreover, the Bill expands the scope of the exemption beyond the 1998 Act, including by augmenting “national security” to include a further undefined range of “defence purposes.”

A number of legal and privacy commentators have raised concerns about the scope of the national security exemptions and the process of issuing national security certificates, and in this regard, in addition to Liberty’s briefing, we encourage Peers to review the briefings of Privacy International, which provide greater detail on this subject. A few critical points are discussed below.

The lack of a definition of “national security” and “defence purposes”

Left undefined, the terms “national security” and “defence purposes” are unnecessarily open to broad and vague interpretation, threatening to remove important limitations on power when doing so is not, in fact, necessary. The lack of a definition also means that people are

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not able to foresee or understand when their personal data rights will be overridden by application of these exemptions – a crucial component of any exemption to fundamental rights.

When this issue arose previously in connection with the similarly undefined national security exemption in the Investigatory Powers Act, the Joint Committee on that draft Bill recommended that it include definitions of national security. 68 In the debate on that Bill, Ken Clarke MP remarked at Second Reading in the House of Commons:

“National security can easily be conflated with the policy of the Government of the day. I do not know quite how we get the definition right, but it is no good just dismissing that point.” 69

Likewise, during the debate on this matter in the House of Lords, the Government was repeatedly pressed on the meaning of the term “defence”, but could do no more than assert that a previous exemption for “combat effectiveness” was deemed insufficient.

The use of these broad and undefined terms risks interference with political and other lawful activity that ought to go unimpeded in a democratic society. In an era when Members of Parliament have been attacked as “traitors” and “mutineers” merely for attempting to amend legislation relating to the UK’s departure from the EU, and when Government has defined the concept of “extremism” to include anything in opposition to “British values,” 70 the continued undefined use of these terms in legislation is more than unacceptable, it is dangerous.

Parliament should not rely on the judiciary to bring substance or meaning to “national security” and “defence”. Empirically, courts have responded with considerable deference to Government claims of “national security,” viewing them not as a matter of law, but as

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70 https://homeofficemedia.blog.gov.uk/2018/01/25/factsheet-on-the-commission-for-countering-extremism/
National security as a legal test is therefore meaningless when left without a statutory definition.

While the judiciary may not define the term for Parliament, it may correctly find that its failure to create a definition violates human rights. On the basis of a similar lack of definition, the European Court of Human Rights found that Russian national legislation granting open-ended discretion to the Russian Executive to undertake interception with the aim of “obtaining information about events or activities endangering the national, military, economic or ecological security of the Russian Federation” was incompatible with the Convention. In Zakharov v Russia, the Court said:

“It is significant that [Russia’s domestic interception law] does not give any indication of the circumstances under which an individual’s communications may be intercepted on account of events or activities endangering Russia’s national, military, economic or ecological security. It leaves the authorities an almost unlimited degree of discretion in determining which events or acts constitute such a threat and whether that threat is serious enough to justify secret surveillance, thereby creating possibilities for abuse.”

Parliament should not risk placing the UK alongside Russia in its approach to human rights. It should instead properly define and limit exemptions to privacy rights based on national security and defence.

These terms can be defined. The UN’s Siracusa Principles provide a definition of “national security.” Amendments defining the term were debated seriously, though not finally adopted, in considering the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. We would urge Parliament to reconsider this issue as a matter of paramount importance.

The lack of independent oversight of national security certificates

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71 Lord Hoffman at para 50, Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman [2001] UKHL 47: Lord Hoffman has stated that whether something is ‘in the interests’ of national security “is not a question of law, it is a matter of judgment and policy” to be determined not by judges but to be “entrusted to the executive”.

72 Zakharov v. Russia, [GC], no. 47143/06, ECHR 2015, para 248.

The lack of a clear definition of the scope of the national security exemptions is compounded by the lack of independent oversight or review of ministers’ invocation of the exemptions. The decision as to whether the exemptions apply lies with ministers. Thus, the test will be met by whatever a minister subjectively decides is related to national security or defence.

The decision is reviewable by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, but the independence of that body has been repeatedly questioned,\(^{74}\) and in any case it may only apply a judicial review standard, which does not permit the court to exercise any oversight over the Minister’s subjective, discretionary determinations.

This year, in response to Liberty’s challenge on behalf of Tom Watson MP to the lack of safeguards and independent oversight in the UK surveillance regime, the Government conceded that additional safeguards—including a far more robust system of independent oversight—were necessary.\(^{75}\) There is no reason why, at a bare minimum, those same provisions should not apply in this context.

**The lack of independent oversight of intelligence agencies generally**

Under the Data Protection Act 1998, the intelligence agencies—like other public agencies—are subject to oversight by the Information Commissioner. The Bill, in clause 110(2), removes that oversight entirely. There is no rationale for exempting the intelligence agencies’ data processing activities from any independent oversight. To the extent that the Information Commissioner is not well-suited to address the sensitivities of data processing in the national security context, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner has an established record of exercising oversight functions in this context.

Liberty strongly recommends that Parliament amends this Bill to define “national security” and “defence purposes”; to limit disquietingly broad exemptions to individual’s data protection rights on national security grounds; and to introduce meaningful oversight of the operation of national security certificates, as well as data processing by the intelligence services more generally.

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DATA PROCESSING FRAMEWORK FOR GOVERNMENT

A set of Government amendments to the Bill late at Committee Stage in the House of Lords introduced powers for the Secretary of State to issue a “Data Processing Framework for Government”, now contained at clauses 185-188 of the Bill. In its explanatory notes to the Bill, the Government states that:

This clause makes provision for the Secretary of State to issue statutory guidance (a “Framework for Data Processing by Government”) about the processing of personal data in connection with the exercise of functions of the persons or bodies listed in subsection (1). Any person carrying out such processing must have regard to this guidance. The Secretary of State may by regulations specify additional persons with functions of a public nature who are required to have regard to the Framework.”

It adds that prior to being brought into force “the Framework must be subject to Parliamentary scrutiny through a process broadly equivalent to the negative resolution procedure”, whereby the draft Framework is laid before both Houses of Parliament and scrutinised over the course of forty days. Clause 186(2) stipulates that “if, within the 40-day period, either House of Parliament resolves not to approve the document, the Secretary of State must not issue it.”

The purported effect of the Framework is set out at clause 188, with obligations placed on data processors, courts and tribunals, and the Information Commissioner’s Office as follows (emphasis added):

“(1) When carrying out processing of personal data which is the subject of a document issued under section 186(3) which is for the time being in force, a person must have regard to the document.

(2) A failure to act in accordance with a provision of such a document does not of itself make a person liable to legal proceedings in a court or tribunal.

(3) A document issued under section 186(3), including an amendment or replacement document, is admissible in evidence in legal proceedings.

76 Data Protection Bill [HL] Explanatory notes, para 540
77 Data Protection Bill [HL] Explanatory notes, para 544
78 Data Protection Bill 2017 (as brought from the House of Lords), clause 186(2)
(4) In any legal proceedings before a court or tribunal, the court or tribunal must take into account a provision of any document issued under section 186(3) in determining a question arising in the proceedings if—

(a) the question relates to a time when the provision was in force, and

(b) the provision appears to the court or tribunal to be relevant to the question.

(5) In determining a question arising in connection with the carrying out of any of The Commissioner's functions, the Commissioner must take into account a provision of a document issued under section 186(3) if—

(a) the question relates to a time when the provision was in force, and

(b) the provision appears to the Commissioner to be relevant to the question.”

The late-stage introduction of these clauses to the Bill means that they were not as closely scrutinised in the House of Lords as other parts, and it is crucial that they are the focus of close attention now that the Bill has reached the Commons. At Report Stage, Peers expressed a range of concerns, echoing those made by the Information Commissioner’s Office; many of which Liberty and other organisations share.

The Government claims that the purpose of the Framework is “to set out the principles and processes that the Government must have regard to when processing personal data”80. It remains unclear, however, why data processing by Government and private companies determined to be fulfilling public functions should be subject to principles and processes distinct from those already set out under this Bill and the GDPR itself. Moreover, the intended effect of a requirement on courts, tribunals and the ICO to “take account” of the Framework lacks meaningful clarity. As the ICO herself points out in relation to what is now clause 188(5):

“The provision runs a real risk of creating the impression that the Commissioner will not enjoy the full independence of action and freedom from external influence when

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79 Data Protection Bill 2017 (as brought from the House of Lords), clause 188
80 Lord Ashton of Hyde in Data Protection Bill Report Stage, 10th January 2018 - Hansard, col. 292
deciding how to exercise her full range of functions as required by Article 52 of the GDPR.\textsuperscript{81}

Indeed, Lord Stevenson has suggested that the framework in effect amounts to an attempt to introduce "a parallel system under which data processing undertaken by government departments could be considered to be governed"\textsuperscript{82} – an exemption to the provisions of the Bill and the GDPR in sheep's clothing.

In addition to concerns about its purpose, Liberty is also alarmed that a Framework purporting to govern the processing of data held by Government, much of which contains the most intimate details of our lives – our school records, social services records, and medical records, for example – should be subject to a level of scrutiny that is broadly similar to the paltry scrutiny afforded a statutory instrument subject to the negative resolution procedure. Liberty's significant concerns with that procedure and delegated powers more broadly are set out in the opening section of this briefing and apply as much here as they do there. As Lord Stevenson pointed out at Report Stage, "citizens’ data should really belong to citizens and we should not have a situation where it is looked after by Ministers on behalf of Ministers and there is no external view."\textsuperscript{83} Lord Clement-Jones went further to argue “[f]rankly, the Secretary of State can pretty much do what he or she wants[...]. [T]he framework for government data protection is not in fact data protection at all.”\textsuperscript{84}

The overly broad latitude afforded to the Secretary of State is illuminated by clause 187(4), which sets out that in circumstances "where the Secretary of State becomes aware that the terms of such a document [issued under the framework] could result in a breach of an international obligation of the United Kingdom", the SoS must remedy this by exercising their power under clause 185(4) to issue a new document or amend the existing one. So not only does the Government envisage a circumstance in which a barely-scrutinised Framework for Data Processing By Government breaches the UK’s international obligations – which would include its obligations under the GDPR, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights – it then proposes to place the responsibility for remedying that breach solely in the hands of the Minister who caused it. If such a

\textsuperscript{81} Information Commissioner’s Office, \textit{Annex II, Data Protection Bill House of Lords Report Stage} – Information Commissioner’s Briefing, para. 13

\textsuperscript{82} Lord Stevenson in Data Protection Bill Report Stage, 10\textsuperscript{th} January 2018 – Hansard, col. 289

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., col. 290

\textsuperscript{84} Lord Clement-Jones in Data Protection Bill Report Stage, 10\textsuperscript{th} January 2018 - Hansard col. 291
Framework is necessary, Parliament must be meaningfully involved not only in any amendment to it to remedy breaches of international law, but in the creation of the document in the first place.

The Government must now set out a robust justification for the introduction of this Framework; and the Framework itself should be included within the Bill so that it can be subject to appropriate scrutiny. Failing that, the vague, overly broad and superfluous powers set out at clauses 185-188 should be removed.